Gazing at subculture with Lacan by Goodfellow, Aaron
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1996 
Gazing at subculture with Lacan 
Aaron Goodfellow 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Goodfellow, Aaron, "Gazing at subculture with Lacan" (1996). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers. 5413. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5413 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Maureen and Mike
MANSFIELD LIBRARY
The University of IVtONTANA
Pennission is granted by the author to reproduce this material in its entirety, 
provided that this material is used for scholarly purposes and is properly cited in 
published works and reports.
* *  Please check "Yes"  or "No” and provide signature
Yes, I grant pennission 
No, I do not grant pennission
Author's Signature
Date
Any copying for commercial purposes or financial gain may be undertaken only with 
the author's explicit consent.
Gazing at Subculture With Lacan.
by
Aaron Goodfellow 
B.A. The University of Vermont, 1990 
presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
The Uni versity of Montana 
1996
Approved by:
Dean, Graduate School
Date
UMI Number: EP40877
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI'
Dissertate PuWistfeg
UMI EP40877
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
uest*
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
Goodfellow, Aaron D.. M.A.. August 1996 Anthropology
Gazing at Subculture with Lacan. (107 pp.)
Chairperson: G.G. Weix
The works of Dick Hebdige and Ann Bolin provide two examples in which the 
commodity form serves as a point of departure for the discussion of the meaning of 
subculture. Although the subject matter of each work is radically different -- Hebdige's 
study concentrates on the stylistic displays of British post - W.W.n youth subcultures 
while Bolin focuses on cross-dressers in contemporary American society -  both authors 
find something more in the commodity form that enables them to describe subculture.
For Hebdige, commodities, when used as signifiers of identity, do not signal the 
emergence of liberated subjects; they signal the reification of pre-existing categories of 
identity. For Bolin the opposite is true; the commodity form can be used as a signifier to 
construct different identities. By investigating these differing conceptions of the 
commodity form and its place in the analysis of identity, we can question the role of the 
commodity in our understanding of subjectivity. My concern is that scholarly efforts that 
view the commodity form as a determining factor in the construction of identity have 
wrongly depicted those who use commodities for self expression.
I will employ the psycho-analytic theory of Jaques Lacan to illustrate how both authors 
miss, or pass over the subjectivity of those represented in their studies. It will become 
apparent that both authors portray those who use commodities for the expression of 
identity inaccurately due to an erroneous conception of the commodity form. Describing 
how these texts result in an inaccurate portrayal of subjectivity allows for a discussion of 
the recent theoretical debate surrounding representation in the social sciences to be 
approached from a Lacanian perspective. It will be shown how Lacanian theory might 
provide an avenue for future ethnographic research that circumvents the perceived crisis 
of representation effecting contemporary anthropology.
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Chapter One: 
Introduction to Dispute
As Dick Hebdige states, the meaning of subculture is always in dispute. “The 
word ‘subculture’ is loaded down with mystery It suggests secrecy, Masonic oaths, an 
underworld.’’(Hebdige1979:4) Its very existence seems to beg contradiction and 
conflict, calling into question the customary repetitions and practices of daily life by 
introducing difference where non is expected. As a result subculture has the capacity 
to problematize the accepted and routinized occurrences of daily life. It problematizes 
the cultural significance of such mundane acts as dressing or choosing a hair style, 
adding an extra layer of significance to the daily rituals we all take part in. I say 
subculture adds significance to the practices and objects of everyday life because in 
subculture the quotidian appears displaced and deformed, begging interpretation. In 
subculture practices and objects are continually “made to mean and mean 
again”(Hebdige1979:3) as something different, something we don’t understand.
An example might be an encounter on the street with a punk or a cross-dresser. 
We see a safety pin stabbed through someone’s cheek and worn as jewelry or the latest 
Haute Couture being adorned and paraded down the street by a Latin man, illuminating 
foreign desires within our midst. In these two instances everyday objects are being 
placed in a context that challenges the accepted cultural use and meaning of the objects 
themselves. The tendency is to develop an understanding of subculture by emphasizing 
the role of volitional subjects who have chosen specific objects for the purpose of
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presenting themselves to the world as different. We look to the object and some 
mysterious quality embedded within that might provide the key for unlocking the 
meaning of subculture. We assume a certain degree of likeness to ourselves since in 
many cases the difference expressed by subculture seems on the brink of being eclipsed 
by similarity if it weren’t exaggerated. As a result the material objects, such as safety 
pins and articles of clothing often become the focus of efforts directed towards 
deciphering the meaning of subculture. And the fact that in contemporary society the 
objects of subculture are commodities, the fascination and appeal of describing 
subculture in terms of its material objects can be understood when given the legacy of 
Karl Marx in the social sciences.
This thesis examines the work of Dick Hebdige and Anne Bolin, two efforts in 
which the significance of the material objects presented to us by subculture guides their 
exploration of subcultural subjectivity. I challenge their readings of subculture by 
questioning the role of choice, volition, and the reading of significance into these 
attributes by looking at the subjects themselves who are using commodities for self 
expression. Although the subject matter of each work is radically different —
Hebdige’s study concentrates on the stylistic displays of British post - W.W.n youth 
subcultures while Bolin focuses on cross-dressers in contemporary American society -- 
their arguments share a common dependence on the commodity form. Both authors 
find significance in the commodity form, enabling them to explain the experience as 
well as the meaning of their subjects practices. As a result, the particular conception of
2
the commodity form held by each author determines the image of the subjects whose 
lives are represented in these texts.
For Hebdige the commodity form cannot provide the means to transcend the 
dominant ideology. Commodities, when used as signifiers of identity, cannot signal the 
emergence of liberated subjects; they can only signal the reification of pre-existing 
categories of identity. Bolin finds the opposite to be true. She finds new potential for 
expressing one’s “self’ in the commodity and its surrounding aesthetic forms. For 
Bolin commodity form can be used as a signifier to express differently constructed 
identities. Such a conclusion posits the commodity as providing the means for the 
emergence of transcendent subjectivities resistant to the dominant ideological structure. 
By investigating these differing conceptions of the commodity form and its place in the 
analysis of identity, we can question the role of the commodity in our understanding of 
subjectivity. This leads to an analysis of the role of the commodity form in 
ethnography. My concern is scholarly efforts that view the commodity form as a 
determining factor in the construction of identity have wrongly depicted those who use 
commodities for self expression.
Psycho-analysis, and in particular the work of Jaques Lacan, provides a 
theoretical approach that explores the correlation between the commodity form and 
subjectivity. Lacan advances a conception of the subject as emerging in language, 
meaning that in Lacanian terms, to be is to be a “being-in-language”. We become 
conscious in language, and as a result all our experiences are mediated by its influence. 
As subjects we do not have access to reality due to the inability of language as a
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symbolic system to accurately and completely represent reality. We continually desire 
and are continually cut off from unification with the real supposedly in existence but 
hidden behind the signifiers of the real in language. This means all representations of 
that real are infused with desire and cover over a lack. Such a conception of 
representation poses a problem for both Hebdige and Bolin since both are claiming the 
commodity form signifies a real. In Hebdige’s case the real signified by the commodity 
form is the reality of capitalism’s social structure: for Bolin it is the reality of changes 
in the form of identity and the intersubjective relationships of contemporary society.
A Lacanian reading of Hebdige and Bolin demands that we view their portrayals 
of subculture as graphic representations taking place in language. This means the 
desire of the author infuses the images of the other crafted by their texts. Desire, then, 
and not the accurate representation of differences in subjectivity becoming the central 
organizing principle of these studies. Such a recognition repositions the commodity 
form in these texts, with the commodity becoming less a signifier of the other’s 
subjectivity and more the hidden kernel around which the author has organized his or 
her desire. Approaching Hebdige and Bolin’s work from this perspective serves as a 
point of departure for the discussion of the commodity form’s position in ethnographic 
research. After Lacan, no longer can commodities be viewed as essential signifiers of a 
particular history nor as signifiers whose consumption provides the means for the 
expression of difference. Rather, the commodity form must be viewed as a signifier 
whose meaning is representative of desire. This means the magical qualities of the 
commodity form do not come from something hidden within it as use-value, nor the
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social relationships expressed by its form, but from its position in a network of 
signifiers arranged by desire.
This discussion of subjectivity and the location of the commodity form in 
ethnography breaks down into four sections. The first section involves a critical 
reading of Hebdige. Hebdige’s understanding of subculture will be challenged by 
illustrating the moment desire prevents him from seeing his subjects. My reading relies 
on the work of Joan Copjec whose work describes the relationship between the subject 
and its representation in a visual field such as Hebdige’s text, from the Lacanian 
perspective. Copjec’s work allows one to see that Hebdige finds something more in the 
commodity form that causes him to miss, or pass over, subjectivity in his study of 
subculture. As a result, the conclusion that punk style does not represent the 
expression of subjectivities resistant to the ideology of society’s dominant is wrong.
The second section builds on the first, examining the construction and expression 
of gender and sex as it is challenged by the “transgender” community. In this chapter I 
engage Bolin’s work as I did Hebdige’s, showing how the conclusion that cross- 
dressing produces liberated subjects is inaccurate. I will show that rather than resisting 
our western binary conceptions of gender, Bolin’s articulation of cross dressing 
produces subjects whose actions reify the categories she seeks to transcend. In this 
section the work of Susan Willis will be used to describe how Bolin’s understanding of 
the relationship between the commodity form, ideology, and the subject is inadequate 
for her described task.
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The third section delves into Lacanian psycho-analytic theoiy. I will show how 
Lacan’s description of the psycho-analytic symptom and the process through which 
psycho-analytic procedure commences provides for an alternative reading of the 
practice of cross-dressing. This discussion leads to an understanding of gender as a 
sign and not as an object around which subjectivity is organized. This enables the 
practice of cross-dressing to be understood as significant because of its infusion with 
pleasure, not political importance. Removing the political element from our 
understanding of cross-dressing places the significance of the act on the subject who 
emerges as cross-dressed and not on the implications of their expressions.
The final section locates the above discussion in the larger debates revolving 
around the politics of representation in anthropology. I will illustrate how Lacan’s 
conception of the subject provides a theoretical perspective that enables the recent 
crisis of representation in the social sciences to possibly be circumvented. This section 
will end with a description of what a Lacanian ethnography might look like. In this 
description the theoretical consideration necessary for conducting ethnographic 
research in contemporary society will be addressed.
Due to the reliance on semiotics and Lacanian psycho-analytic theory the 
vocabulary of this study tends to be obscure. It is helpful to know that when I use the 
terms “sign”, “signifier”, and “signified”, I am using them as they were defined in the 
work on semiology by Ferdinand de Sassaure. In this usage “signified” is used to 
describe the actual object being represented by a symbol, known as the “signifier”. The 
“sign” is the conceptual unit formed by the association of these two terms. In
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Saussure’s own words the sign is defined as follows: “The linguistic sign unites, not a 
thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not the material 
sound, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our 
senses. ’’(Saussure1959:149) Since this is not a linguistic study, but one that relies on 
the insights of linguistics for the analysis of cultural forms, the signs I am dealing with 
unite a concept and a visual image such as a commodity with the body.
The vocabulary of Lacanian psycho-analytic theoiy is too difficult to clarify in 
advance. The best I can do is define and describe the meaning of Lacan’s terms as I 
work with them in the body of this paper. Although obscure and seemingly 
impenetrable the work of Lacan provides an alternati ve position that enables the 
practices of subculture to be understood in a different and positive light that captures 
the dynamics of the social processes that bring the spectacular and flamboyant displays 
of subculture into existence.
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Chapter Two: 
Viewing the Prison House Walls
Dick Hebdige begins Subcultures; the Meaning of Style with a discussion of Jean 
Genet the notorious French outlaw, homosexual, and artist. Hebdige draws a graphic 
description of how common everyday items are imbued with meaning from Genet’s 
work, The Thief s Journal. Or, in Hebdige’s own words, a description of how things 
are made to “mean and mean again as ‘style’ in subculture”.(Hebdigel979:3) The 
passage from Genet referred to by Hebdige involves the discovery of a tube of Vaseline 
by the Spanish Police during a raid on Genet’s flat. As Hebdige states, “This ‘dirty, 
wretched object’, proclaimed his [Genet’s] homosexuality to the 
world.”(Hebdigel979:l) The importance of this tube of Vaseline for both Genet and 
Hebdige is its capability to act as a sign, a sign that carrying two different meanings.
At one level Genet’s tube of Vaseline serves as an object signifying his illegal 
sexuality; an object whose possession opens him to the derision and moral outrages of a 
society that bars homosexuality. On a different level it serves as a sign of resistance 
and strength for its owner for, after being subjected to the “hostile innuendo” of the 
police during his arrest, the Vaseline took on a life of its own. In the possession of the 
police the Vaseline served as a trace - as a constant reminder of an illicit world of 
unknown pleasures and secret identities slipping through the grasp of authority. So 
when Genet states, “I would indeed rather have shed blood than repudiate that silly
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object”(Genet in Hebdigel979:3), he is referring to the power of the object to act as a 
sign. Genet further reveals the power of the sign in the following passage.
I was sure that this puny and most humble object would hold its own against them; by its 
mere presence it would be able to exasperate all the police in the world; it would draw 
upon itself contempt, hatred, white and dumb rages.(Genet in Hebdigel979:2)
This may seem a strange place to begin a discussion of subcultures but the
experience of Genet deriving power and emotional sustenance from his tube of
Vaseline while lying imprisoned for crimes against “nature” and “morality” describes
the meaning and experience of subculture for Hebdige. The image of the prison, of the
prisoner, of the everyday item, and of the ability of a sign to challenge the laws of those
who define it lies at the heart of Hebdige’s study. For, in the end Hebdige finds the
constructions of subcultures, although spectacular and flamboyant in their expressions
of resistance and refusal, to be nothing more than, “The darker side of sets of
regulations, just so much graffiti on a prison wall.”(Hebdigel979:3) For Hebdige
subcultures signal difference, identities of refusal standing in opposition to the
‘straight’ world; but in the end those who challenge the “natural” laws and codes of
“decency” lie imprisoned by the reality from which they seek to challenge and free
themselves. To decipher why this might be involves unpacking Hebdige’s text,
revealing his work to be just as much about ideology as it is about identity and just as
much about commodities as it is about subjectivity. This project begins with a
question, asking; What is the cause of Hebdige’s conclusion that subcultural
expressions are nothing more than the subordinate, c“Make(ing) something out of what 
■ made r f t t a n K S t *  in Hebdigel979:139) And fl* answer to the question iies in
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Barthes’ conception of semiotics and Althusser’s understanding of ideology, the 
launching point of Hebdige’s analysis of subcultures.
In Subcultures. Hebdige develops a complex argument geared towards 
understanding identity, the subversive potential of subcultures, and the expression of 
difference through an analysis of style in youth subculture. Hebdige develops his 
argument in light o f Roland Bathes’ work in semiotics outlining the presence of 
ideology in everyday cultural occurrences. What is interesting about Barthes work is 
his lack of concern for discerning the good from the bad in mass cultural forms. In 
Mythologies, the work from which Hebdige draws his understanding of subcultures, 
Barthes devotes himself to explaining how the occurrences of everyday life in a class 
bound society are made to seem “perfectly natural”. A prime example of Barthes 
concern might be our response to professional wrestling on television. When we turn 
on the television we hardly think twice about huge men dressed as super heroes 
performing a choreographed piece of violence.1 Rather we take a bemused note, ignore 
the cultural messages and themes expressed by the performance, and, maybe, turn the 
channel. This response for Barthes signals the ability of ideology to hide its operations 
within and behind the form of everyday cultural occurrences. Rather than causing 
immediate concern and reflection upon the origins and meaning of cultural forms the 
televised wrestling match denies discussion of its origins, marking the most insidious
1 The form of wrestling matches was o f interest to Barthes due to their comic book depiction of our cultural 
conceptions of good and evil. According to Barthes, in a professional wrestling match, the forces of good 
and evil duke it, revealing the necessity of specific cultural values to triumph over alternatives. So in 
choosing the professional wrestling as an example, I am not only illustrating Barthes work, but drawing from 
it as well.
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aspect of ideology, the capacity to make the obvious practices and interests of a 
dominant group appear “perfectly natural” and normal.
For Barthes the apparent normalcy of everyday life is dependent upon 
mythologies, or stories understood as true and beyond questioning. We understand 
cultural occurrences, such as contact with the world of professional wrestling, as 
perfectly natural due to a mythology that explains certain cultural forms and behaviors 
as “given”. Men dressed as super heroes throwing each other around in mock displays 
of violence are explained in common sensical terms, as a natural propensity for 
violence in males or as entertainment “needs” being met by the laws of supply and 
demand. What these explanations miss is the cultural messages expressed by the form 
such entertainments take. Only upon reflection do we realize that televised wrestling 
matches speak to us in a moralizing tone, defining the perseverance of “good” cultural 
values over evil.2
When the appearance of a specific conglomeration of signs, such as professional 
wrestling matches, are understood as being “perfectly natural”, or when behaviors and 
practices are performed without question, a mythology is in place. Mythologies are 
given currency by cultural forms that reify the message and the reality of those whose 
practices society has appropriated as the norm. “Mythology” carries out the work of 
ideology by disseminating a seamless picture of “natural” social relation over our 
everyday experience. In other words, the specific conventions and social practices of a 
dominant group are objectified in cultural forms manufactured to present the specifics
2 For an in depth analysis of televised wrestling see Barthes 1957,
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of social interaction within an alienated social order as the generalized experience of 
all humanity.(see Horkheimenl968) The result is the fabrication of complex 
semiological systems whose messages tell us exactly how normal the peculiar is. Mass 
cultural forms such as film, fashion, and cuisine are part of this ‘second order 
semiological system’ expressing the ‘artificial nature’ of social relations in a rhetoric of 
common sense -- a rhetoric that hides the historicity and meanings of the rituals 
performed in contemporary society.
Language
Signifier | Signified
Sign
Signifier Signified
Sign
(Figure 1. Bathes Understanding of Mythology)
The example Hebdige uses to illustrate Barthes concern over our “manufactured 
sense” is Barthes analysis of a photograph taken of a French soldier saluting the flag. 
The picture appeared on the cover of a French magazine, called Paris-Match, and 
expresses the multiple layers of significance that overlay all apparently normal cultural 
form. By following Barthes “reading” of the photograph the capacity of semiotics to 
reveal the hidden ideological messages contained within the “perfectly natural” 
occurrence of a soldier saluting the flag is disclosed. For Barthes the meaning of the 
photograph is readily apparent in the image; the picture in question depicts a man 
showing respect for his country, the military, and French nationalism. The second 
order of meaning signified by the same image is, “that France is a great empire, that all
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her sons, without any color discrimination, (the pictured soldier is black) faithfully 
serve under her flag, and that there is no better answer to the detractors of an alleged 
colonialism than the zeal shown by this Negro in serving his so-called 
oppressors. "(Barthes1957:116)
In Barthes secondary reading we see the ideological underpinnings informing our 
everyday experience exposed. We see the photograph as expressing a blatantly 
political message overlain by a systematically organized set of rules and codes that 
bring the political message into discourse, but in such a way that “forbids talking” 
about the origins and meaning of the image’s content. The secondary “connotated” 
meaning of the image is not readily apparent because a mythology hiding the historical 
origins of the image is in place. As a result, the image serves the political purpose of 
establishing the reality of the dominant as the status quo. We do not question the 
historical reasons for the content or the appearance of the image, rather common sense 
says: the army is racially mixed, people in the army salute, the person in the picture is a 
soldier, so of course he salutes the flag. This process of “reading” the representations 
of everyday experience, developed by Barthes, shows “how all the apparently 
spontaneous forms and rituals of contemporary societies are subject to a systematic 
distortion, liable at any moment to be de-historicized, ‘naturalized’, converted into 
myth.”(Hebdigel979:9) It then becomes the semiotician’s task to unravel the common 
ideological core hidden behind all cultural forms and it is this desire that guides 
Hebdige’s analysis of subculture.
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Hebdige is able to peer beneath ‘mythology’ at the hidden codes and conventions 
of such secondary semiologic systems as Rastafarian or Punk style due to Barthes’ 
conception of the sign. The particulars of Barthes’ conceptualization of the sign are 
important to our understanding of Hebdige’s work since they not only bring Hebdige to 
his topic, but graphically define the subjects of his analysis. In fact, it is safe to say, the 
image of subculture painted by Hebdige’s analysis is symptomatic of Barthes’ 
articulation of the sign. In order to fully understand the cause of Hebdige’s analysis, 
Barthes conception of the sign must be unpacked. And the process of unpacking the 
contents of the sign begins with a dozen roses.
The example Barthes uses to describe the constituent parts of a sign is a bunch of 
roses. As Barthes states:
Take a bunch o f roses: I use it to signify my passion. Do we have here, then, only a 
signifier and a signified, the roses and my passion? Not even that: to put it accurately, 
there are here only ‘passionified’ roses. But on the plane of analysis, we do have three 
terms; for those roses weighted with passion perfectly and correctly allow themselves to 
be decomposed into roses and passion: the former and the latter existing before uniting 
and forming this third object, which is the sign. It is as true to say that on the plane of 
experience I cannot confiise the rose from the message they carry, as to say that on the 
plane of analysis I cannot confuse the roses as signifier and the roses as sign: the signifier 
is empty, the sign is full, it is a meaning.(Barthesl957:113)
What is immediately apparent is that Barthes’ sign is made of three constituent parts. 
“There is the signifier, the signified and the sign, which is the associative total of the 
two terms.”(Barthes:113;l957) The signified is the material object, in our case 
identity, the signifier is the visual representation of that object, and the sign is the 
meaning associated with the two. Or to return to Genet, the signifier is the tube of 
Vaseline, the signified: Genet’s homosexuality, and the sign: knowledge of the illicit 
world of criminality and pleasure existing beyond the grasp of authority. The most
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important aspect of Barthes’ semiotics is how he sees the sign connecting the signifier 
with the signified, for it is here that ideology takes hold and dictates knowledge in the 
form of mythology.
To describe the relationship between the signifier, signified and the sign, Barthes 
uses the work of Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure whose work emphasizes the 
arbitrary nature of the sign. For Saussure, as well as Barthes, there is no necessary 
connection between the signifier and the signified. The connection between these two 
constituent parts is one of social convention and not of essence. The semiological 
system in which the signifier “Tree” is made to stand in for the material object 
associated with that signifier is one of convention and supersedes the control of any one 
individual. One learns a semiologic system such as language, one does not invent it as 
he or she go. Barthes states that, “The signified is the concept, the signifier is the 
acoustic image (which is mental) and the relationship between concept and image is the 
sign. ’’(Barthes: 113; 1957)
Although Saussure’s original articulation of the sign was developed as a 
methodology for linguistic analysis, Barthes extends Saussure’s idea of semiologic 
systems to include all systems of formal logic; hence the potential of semiotics as a tool 
for cultural analysis. Rather than dealing strictly with language Barthes deals with 
discourse, or the study of “ideas-in-form”; Barthes seeks knowledge of the form in 
which ideas are presented and re-presented in different cultural instances. Re­
presentation is the realm of mythology and is of particular importance since in this
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secondary realm, not only are things made to “mean and mean again”, but disparate 
objects are made to signify and signify again the same thing, a unified historical reality.
The nature of the mythical signification can in fact be well conveyed by one particular 
simile: it is neither more nor less arbitrary than an ideograph. Myth is a pure ideographic 
system where the forms are still motivated by the concept which they represent while not 
yet, by a long way, covering the sum of its possibilities for 
representation. (Barthesl957:127)
At this point we can return to Hebdige and begin describing how Barthes’ work 
acts as a determinant in Hebdige’s understanding of subculture. What is immediately 
apparent is that Barthes’ work informed the very location of Hebdige’s analysis. 
Hebdige’s work concentrates on subcultural style, or the form in which identity is 
presented. Hebdige hopes to glean knowledge of the interaction between society’s 
dominant and subordinate groups by analyzing the sartorial displays of subculture.
This is possible due to the capacity of sartorial displays to act as an ideographic 
representation of social life. Hebdige illustrates this point by referring again to Genet: 
“For, just as the conflict between Genet’s ‘unnatural’ sexuality and the policemen’s 
‘legitimate’ outrage can be encapsulated in a single object, so the tensions between 
dominant and subordinate groups can be found reflected in the surfaces of subculture - 
in the styles made up of mundane objects which have a double 
meaning.”(Hebdigel979:2) Literally in the clothing of subculture Hebdige finds the 
tensions between the dominant and subordinate groups to be ‘writ large’ in the 
language of a Barthian second order semiological system, in which the chimerical 
objects used to express difference - “a safety pin, a pointed shoe, a motor cycle” - are 
found to express identity. But it is an impotent identity. In the end Hebdige finds Punk
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style to signify difference, but the sign fails to break free from the universalizing 
tendencies of mythology. Rather, Punk style remains a surface phenomenon signifying, 
and signifying again, difference, but a difference continually falling short of the “self 
imposed exile” sought by subculture members. Mythology continually captures and 
recaptures the motivated efforts of subcultural members who, according to Hebdige are 
tyring to break free from the universalizing discourse of society’s dominant.
Perhaps the clearest example of subculture’s impotence is seen in Hebdige’s 
description of Punk style as “white ethnicity”. In the following passage Hebdige 
contrasts the development of reggae and urban black style with that of Punk. The 
conclusion drawn by Hebdige is that Punk style does not express a positive alternative 
identity resistant to the historical reality of the dominant. Rather, the signifiers 
activated by the Punks form a sign expressing the subculture’s “true colors” as “lifers 
in solitaiy despite the fierce tattoos.”(Hebdigel979:66) This argument is based on 
Barthes’ conceptualization of the sign and its relation to ideology. For, as Hebdige 
makes clear, the location in which the Punks sought to ground their alternative identity 
had no historic precedent. Punks sought to ground their identity in the land of 
commodities and this land was already claimed by the mythology of the dominant.
Whereas urban black youth could place themselves through reggae ‘beyond the pale’ in an 
imagined elsewhere (Africa, or the West Indies) the punks were tied to present time. They 
were bound to Britain which had no foreseeable future. But this difference could be 
magically elided. By a simple sleight of hand, the co-ordinates o f time and place could be 
dissolved, transcended, converted into signs. Thus it was that the punks turned towards 
the world a dead white face which was there and yet not ‘there’. Like the myths of 
Roland Barthes, these ‘murdered victims’ -emptied and inert - also had an alibi, an 
elsewhere, literally ‘made up’ out of Vaseline and cosmetics, hair dye and mascara. But 
paradoxically, b  the case of the punks, this ‘elsewhere’ was also a nowhere - a twilight 
zone - a zone constituted out of negativity. Like Andre’ Breton’s Dada, punk might seem 
to ‘open all the doors’ but these doors ‘gave onto a circular corridor’. They reflected b  a 
heightened form a percieved condition: a condition of unmitigated exile, voluntarily 
assumed. But whereas exile had a specific meaning, implied (albeit magical) solution b
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the context of Rastafarianism and Negro history, when applied metaphorically to British 
white youth it could only delineate a hopeless condition. (Hebdigel979:65)3
The signs of identity used by Punks are commodities and commodities, for Hebdige, 
are always already tied into a secondary semiologic system that serves as a tool of 
normalization for the dominant. And, in Hebdige’s mind, a historical and geographic 
origin can not be based upon a cultural form that is already de-historicized and whose 
appearance “forbids talking” about its origins. So by using a commodity as a signifier 
of identity one is not challenging the status quoe but reifying the social reality from 
which emancipation is sought. It is in this way that subcultures are “just so much 
graffiti on a prison wall”.(Hebdigel979:3)
It is important to investigate this relationship between identity, ideology, and the 
commodity form since it is the nature of this relationship that allows Hebdige to unlock 
the message of subcultural style. It might even be said that this time-worn tripartite is 
the hinge on which all of Hebdige’s text hangs. In this case it is useful to push the 
analogy of a door swinging on a hinge. A door swinging open describes discovery, 
providing a description of gaining access to hidden worlds, while also describing 
concealment, acting as a barricade as well. Hebdige’s conception of the commodity 
form and its relationship to ideology opens a door that appears to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of subculture but, upon close reflection, the door Hebdige opens conceals
3 An interesting side note to this passage concerns the treatment of race by Hebdige. For Hebdige, due to 
the racial element informing the development of raggae, black urban subcultures express a positive identity 
complete with geographical and historical underpinnings, but Britain “white” punks do not. The trace of 
race that signals viable alterity exists in the skin and not on the surface o f a second order semiological 
system. Although a Rastafarian in London may have no personal contact with the African continent or the 
West Indies, the trace of that history is in their skin.
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as much as it reveals. Hebdige’s door acts as much as a barricade as it does an 
entry way, concealing the subjects of study as it reveals the desire of Hebdige as a 
subject. With this said it is important to investigate the hinge, the mechanism upon 
which Hebdige’s text depends, emphasizing the moment the door swings open just 
enough to peer into the inner sanctum of a room but remains closed enough to conceal 
the subject hiding behind the door that lies ajar. This discussion begins with Hebdige’s 
conception of ideology and its relationship to the sign.
The definition of ideology used by Hebdige is a filtered version of Marx’s 
definition established in The German Ideology. Stemming from an originary division 
of labor, ideology emphasizes the historical development of a false consciousness 
paralleling the bourgeoisie’s rise to power. This “false consciousness” hides the true 
economic and social structure of capitalism (i.e. one person’s profit is another’s unpaid 
labor) behind the materialized ideals of bourgeois social life. Implied within this 
definition is the existence of an objective and true set of social relations, a whole 
society absent of alienation where humans can live out their species being. Hebdige’s 
definition is a filtered version of the original because his work is informed by later 
scholars, such as Althusser and Stuart Hall, who have bent Marx’s original conception 
of ideology to fit the needs of understanding contemporary capitalist culture. Hall and 
Althusser’s adjustments revolve around the relationship between power and the 
formation of consciousness. Both authors push the influence of ideology behind the 
conscious subject, locating its operation in the unconscious. In doing so the 
conspiratorial aspect of culture was removed from the equation that describes such
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contemporary cultural forms as the structure of the modem family and political 
institutions. With Hall’s and Althusser’s adjustments to Marx’s original definition, no 
longer are the production and reproduction of specific social structures seen as 
motivated efforts initiated by individuals whose best interest is served by the 
dissemination of a specific message. Rather, ideology is seen as the embodiment of 
form and structure. The relationship between ideology, the formation of consciousness, 
and contemporary cultural forms is made clear by Althusser’s statement:
Ideology has very little to do with ‘consciousness’...It is profoundly 
unconscious...Ideology is indeed a system of representation, but in the majority of cases 
these representations have nothing to do with ‘consciousness’: they are usually images and 
occasionally concepts, but it is above all as structures that they impose on the vast 
majority o f men, not via their ‘consciousness’. They are perceived-accepted-suffered 
cultural objects and they act functionally on men via a process that escapes them.
(Althusser in Hebdigel979:12)
What is important to recognize in this definition is the ubiquity of ideology. For 
the above scholars where there is meaning, there too is ideology. Signification is 
grounded in an ideological apparatus that connects the sign to the signified. This 
translates into an understanding of culture as a repository of ideology with structure 
being the embodiment of domination. If ideology is to be understood as a structural 
component of everyday life, as existent in the “perceived-accepted-suffered” objects of 
culture, then cultural forms as well as their contents must be understood as being 
saturated in ideology. Or, more simply, ideology can be understood as the “Semantic 
rules and codes which are not directly apprehended in experience.”(Hebdigel979:13) 
After we have discarded the notion of a “false consciousness” this new 
conceptualization of ideology retains Marx’s original idea of a “true” and “whole” set
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of social relations hidden from view by the consciousness of the dominant. An 
objective set of “real” social relations is always present and serving as the goal or 
object of the “cultural studies” undertaken by these authors. Perhaps the clearest 
example of the notion of an objective world of social relations hidden from view is 
seen in Stuart Hall’s statement concerning the transparency of ideology which reads, 
“You cannot learn, through common sense, how things are: you can only discover 
where they fit into the existing scheme of things.’’(Hall in Hebdigel979:l 1) It is the 
“how things are” out on the streets for the youth of Britain that Hebdige seeks through 
his analysis of subculture, only rather than discovering “how things are”, he discovers 
where things fit into the structure of class. In the end Hebdige reveals the content 
hidden by the form but not the secret of the form itself. He does not reveal the secret of 
experiencing class but rather reveals the hidden contents of ideology.
An analogy drawn from the work of Freud helps describe how Hebdige’s efforts 
to produce a formal analysis of subcultures ends in a content analysis of ideology, with 
subculture being part of the overall contents of our class bound society. In The 
Interpretation of Dreams. Freud describes the theoretical considerations necessary to 
avoid being fooled into believing that the hidden contents o f a dream have any use in 
the analytic procedure. Rather, as Freud makes apparent, the secret to be revealed is in 
the form itself. “The theoretical intelligence of the form of dreams does not consist in 
penetrating the manifest content to its ‘hidden kernel’ of truth, the latent dream- 
thoughts; it consists in answering the question: why have the latent dream-thoughts 
assumed such a form, why were they transposed into the form of a
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dream?”(Zizekl 989:11) The importance of moving away from a contents analysis of
form, understood by Freud, is described by Zizek as follows:
Herein, then lies the basic misunderstanding: if we seek the ‘secret o f the dream’ in the 
latent content hidden by the manifest text, we are doomed to disappointment: all we find is 
some entirely ‘normal’ - albeit usually unpleasant - thought, the nature o f which is mostly 
non-sexual and definitely not ‘unconscious’. This ‘normal’, conscious/preconscious 
thought is not drawn towards the unconscious, repressed simply because o f its 
‘disagreeable’ character for the conscious, but because it achieves a kind of ‘short circuit’ 
between it and another desire which is already repressed, located in the unconscious, a 
desire which has nothing whatsoever to do with the ‘latent dream-thought. It is this 
unconscious/sexual desire which cannot be reduced to a ‘normal train of thought’ because 
it is, from the very beginning, constituatively repressed (Freud’s Urverdrangung) - because 
it has no ‘original in the ‘normal’ language o f everyday communication, I the syntax of the 
conscious/preconscious; its only place is in the mechanism of the ‘primary 
process’.(Zizekl989:13)
What Hebdige has done is to reveal the form ideology has taken in contemporary 
society: class, penetrated one aspect of its manifest content (subculture) and revealed 
the ‘hidden kernel’, that is the commodity form acting as a sign of the ideological 
structure that produced it and its meaning. In other words, Hebdige concentrates on the 
form of ideology, poses the correct questions, but fails to gain an understanding of why 
class has taken the form it has in subculture. Hebdige has produced a text revealing the 
contents of class while failing to explain “the way things are” for those who manifest 
class. Class is posited as a pre-existing category ordering the enunciations of those 
who speak with commodities. Hebdige’s dilemma is caused by his conception of 
ideology which continually causes him to look for the “true” social relations hidden 
behind the markers of identity, thus falling prey to a “fascination” with the contents of 
ideology and missing the message expressed by its form, class, has taken. And perhaps 
this explains the necessity of Hebdige’s apologetic disclaimer at the end of his book:
Thus, while Genet embodies our object most clearly, in the end Barthes is closest to us.
He understands the problems of the reader - ‘the mythologist’ who can no longer be one 
with the ‘myth consumers’....The cord has been cut: we are cast in a marginal role. We
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are in society but not inside it, producing analyses of popular culture which are themselves 
anything but popular. We are condemned to a ‘theoretical sociality’ ‘in camera’ to the 
text - caught between the object and our reading. The study of subcultural style which 
seemed at the outset to draw us back towards the real world, to reunite us with ‘the 
people’, ends by merely confirming the distance between the reader and the ‘text’, 
between everyday life and the ‘mythologist’ whom it surrounds, fascinates and finally 
excludes. It would seem that we are still, like Barthes ‘condemned for some time yet to 
speak excessively about reality’.(Hebdigel979:140)
Upon first reading, Hebdige’s apology seems justified and clear. It seems obvious 
he would want to apologize to his both his readers and those from whom the study 
draws for the short-comings of his text. After all, as he points out, the book does 
succumb “to a kind of romanticism”, straying from “the legitimate concerns of 
sociologists”. It also seems obvious that he might offer apologies to those to whom he 
turned for knowledge since he failed to produce a text in which they might recognize 
themselves. But upon closer examination it becomes apparent that there is something 
more going on in Hebdige’s apology, a something more that anticipates in advance a 
certain lack covered over by his text. With this said let’s look at the apology closely; 
for contained within Hebdige’s final sentimental sentences lies the “something more” 
that causes knowledge of ‘how things are’ in subculture to slip from Hebdige’s grasp. 
As it turns out this humble apology is crucial to the text. It contains the essence of 
Althusser’s definition of ideology, providing the moment in which we can begin to 
speak of subjectivity. Because within the final statements of the book we can see 
Hebdige’s true relationship to the subjects of his study. In his apology Hebdige reveals 
not only an unfulfilled desire but also the defining characteristics of his conception of 
subculture - a conception that allows subjectivity to evade him.
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In order to understand how subjectivity evades Hebdige’s reading of style we 
need to return to Althusser’s and Barthes’ understanding of ideology as its effects are 
crystallized as a sign in Hebdige’s text. And that moment is when Hebdige states, “We 
are condemned to a ‘theoretical sociality’ ‘in camera’ to the text - caught between the 
object and our reading.’’(Hebdige1979:140) In this statement, unbeknownst to 
Hebdige, he reveals the truth pertaining to his relationship to subculture and a lack in 
his understanding of the subject that is covered over by the text. Even more relevant, 
this statement comes as an apology.
When Hebdige makes the above claim he is describing the predicament of the 
student of subculture. According to Hebdige, the researcher is condemned to a position 
of marginality because their knowledge prevents them from “taking the apparent for 
granted”. In other words, the researcher is denied fulfillment of the desire to live in the 
world of his subjects - a world in which the structural component of domination 
inherent to a class bound society has been resolved - due to the hidden kernel of truth, 
known by the researcher, to reside in all mass cultural forms. The researcher is 
prevented from experiencing the “magical solution” to the constraints of ideology lived 
by Punks, Skinheads, and Rastafarians due to knowledge of mythology. Rather, 
Hebdige feels a sense of condemnation to a life in “uneasy cerebral relation to the bric- 
a-brac of life”, with “the mundane forms and rituals whose function it is to make us 
feel at home”(Hebdige1979:139) having the opposite effect. For the mythologist 
‘myth-consumption’ signals anxiety and fear, revealing the worst nightmare of the 
properly Marxist semiotician, the ‘arbitrary nature’ of everyday experience. The
24
mythologist is cast into a marginal role to “straight” society as well as subculture due to 
his or her knowledge of mythology and the operation of ideology in all cultural forms. 
As Hebdige states, the marginality of the intellectual seems like a perfect place from 
which to approach other fringe peoples, secure in our assurance of a common 
experience between intellectual and outlaw, knowledge of a world where everything 
has significance, where everything reveals our position outside society. Semiotician, 
Punks, and Genet: aliens in their own society, living a “self-imposed exile” where the 
truths pertaining to the codes of society are continually revealed and subverted; we are 
liberated, but not free. Aside from expressing a romantic sentimentality of the social 
critic as a castigated and tortured soul, Hebdige, as an intellectual, gladly recognizes 
himself reflected in this text, while the actual subjects of the study do not. Why might 
this be, and why is this cause for apology? The answer to this question is difficult since 
it involves a return to ideology and its effects on determining the subjects of this study.
In order to understand why subculture, as presented here, does not reflect back as 
a self-identical image we need to turn to the work of Joan Copjec whose work explains 
the shortcomings of Althusser’s conception of ideology in terms of the Lacanian 
definition of the subject. Her book is a critique of the contemporary efforts, such as 
Foucault’s and Althusser’s, to historicize the emergence of the modem subject. Since 
she is a Lacanian scholar her vocabulary is extremely obscure, so please bear with me.
Copjec begins her critique of Althusser by calling into question the “F’ which is 
articulated as being situated “in camera” to the subject of study. According to Copjec 
this position can be described as a process in which the “F’ of the subject is rendered
25
visible by “the instrument through which...[the] I [is] photo-graphed.”(Copjecl994:31)4 
What this statement means is that for Althusser, and Hebdige as well, “The gaze [of the 
author] determines the complete visibility of the “F  (Copjecl994:32), and the 
theoretical apparatus, or ‘the camera’, used to view the subject determines our 
perceptions of that “F . So when Hebdige states that he is “in camera” to the object of 
his study, he is saying that his theoretical apparatus is literally mapping the “F  he is 
viewing. He is exposing and defining the desires and intentions of his subject as it 
emerges through his analysis. Hebdige is telling the truth about subjects revealed by 
the gaze of his theoretical apparatus, that is, subjects who do not recognize themselves 
in that gaze. When given the nature of this relationship it becomes immediately 
apparent why Hebdige feels the need to apologize. While Hebdige’s own theorizing 
may place him in a marginal position to society, preventing him the fulfillment of 
certain desires, his analysis objectifies his subjects in a gaze that reveals all except the 
constructed position of the researcher’s gaze. What is at stake here is the relationship 
between the self and the “other”, the self as mythologist, and the “other” as object of 
the gaze, an object that is made visible through the gaze of the self.
Hebdige seeks solace in the object that fails to recognize itself reflected in his 
study. For Hebdige this mis-recognition equals the preservation of a safe haven in 
which the “imaginary” solutions of subculture can continue without being “killed by 
the kindness” of social scientists. However if the subject does not recognize itself in
4
Although this statement concerning the relationship between the I and the “camera” was originally made 
by Lacan, Copjec is using this statement in her text to expose the erroneous assumptions pertaining to 
subjectivity in Althusser’s conception of ideology.
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its image as it is represented in Hebdige’s text, the gaze assumes to be representing the 
object of study as it actually is, as it has been constructed historically. Mis-recognition 
by the subject operates at the level of ideology to produce ‘the camera’, and to imply an 
error on the subject’s part but not on the theoretical apparatus of the researcher.
Copjec describes this process as the subject’s failure to properly recognize its true 
relation to the visible world.(Copjec1994:32). As Copjec states its this process of 
installing the subject in a position of misrecognition “operates without the hint of 
failure.”(Copjecl994:32)
The subject unerringly assumes the position the perspectival construction bids it to take.
Erased from the process of construction, the negative force o f error emerges later as a 
charge directed at the subject. But from where does it come? Film theory has described 
only the construction of this position o f misrecognition. Though it implies that there is 
another actual, nonpunctiform, position, film theory has never been able to describe the 
construction of this position.(Copjecl994:33)
Hebdige raises a charge against the subjects of subculture because he perceives a 
failure on their part to provide the desired freedom sought by the researcher. The 
freedom Hebdige desires is characterized by the unification of the researcher with “the 
people”. Such a union would signal the end the end of his alienation as an intellectual. 
There is a fundamental problem with Hebdige’s conception of the subject. The subject 
does not misrecognize itself in his gaze, a gaze which objectifies the subject. Rather, it 
reveals the subject has actually evaded his gaze, and misrecognition is being leveled as 
a charge against the subject of subculture. Hebdige is saying “silly punk, you just can’t 
see the truth of your own actions.” The Lacanian reading of this mis-recognition sees 
the subject viewing his or her representation, asking: “who me?” and replying no. The 
subject has deceived Hebdige, revealing the flaw in his conception of the subjects he is
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studying as they slip out from underneath his gaze. Hebdige covers over this flawed 
conception of the subject with the excessive meaning of the commodity form.
Lacan takes into consideration the deceptive capacity of the subject who refuses 
to ignore the constructed nature of the “I” that exists “in camera” to itself. By 
explaining the Lacanian conception of the relationship between self and other we can 
see how Hebdige missed the subject. Rather than sparing the subject the subject spared 
him, thus positing an entirely new meaning to the apologetic ending of the text. In 
order to explain Lacan’s conception of the relationship between the self and other we 
need to refer to that famous diagram of the two interpenetrating triangles.
The Subject 
of Representation
im age
screenThe G aze <
(Figure 2. Diagram o f the Lacanian Gaze)
In the di agram, Lacan overlays two triangles in such a manner that the base lines 
are parallel, with the apex of each separate triangle intersecting the mid-point of the 
opposite triangles base-line. These two points at the apex of each triangle represent the 
origin of the gaze as it is experienced by the subject of representation as well as the 
author. At the mid point, where the vertical members of the two triangles intersect,
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Lacan has drawn a short line parallel to the base lines. This short center line represents 
what Lacan calls the ‘image screen’, and is crucial to our understanding of the gaze, 
and the misrecognition of the subject represented by that gaze.
In the Althusser/Hebdige model only one of these triangles is taken into 
consideration. Thus, the subject revealed by Hebdige’s gaze is directly correlated to 
the laws of optics in which the picture taken by “the camera” actually does reveal all, 
producing what Copjec calls a “centered and transcendent subject.” In this way the self 
misrecognition in its reflected image is a matter of ideology. The self does not 
recognize its own image because ideology has warped the image of what the self looks 
like to that self. This implies an actual position from which the constructed nature of 
the self can be viewed absent of the refracting effects of ideology. For Lacan, on the 
other hand, this misrecognition expresses a more profound internal dialectic in which 
the subject mistakenly believes that a space exists beyond what is revealed by the gaze. 
It is Lacan’s inclusion of the second triangle in which the subject of representation 
looks back at the gaze that illustrates this point.
The second triangle diagrams the subject’s mistaken belief that there is something behind 
the space set out by the first. [The graphic depiction of Althusser and Hebdige’s gaze] It 
is this mistaken belief (this misrecognition) that causes the subject to disbelieve even those 
representations shaped according to the scientific laws of optics. The Lacanian subject, 
who may doubt the accuracy of even its most ‘scientific representations,’ is submitted to a 
superegoic law that is radically different from the optic laws to which the film theoretical 
subject is submitted.(Copjecl994:33)
The superegoic law to which Copjec refers is The Law of Signification, those 
originary laws of language that establish the subject as a desiring being. For our 
discussion of subculture, when Hebdige claims the misrecognition of the subject to be a
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product of ideology, an imaginary space in which the subject believes it is transcending 
the laws of society, he is mistaken. Rather, the subject’s misrecognition of its “self’ is 
a loop-hole in the symbolic that continually allows the subject to imagine a position 
outside and beyond the imaginary in which it exists as a transcendent subject. Thus the 
subject is never trapped in the imaginary because the imaginary always invites one to 
imagine a position outside the perspective of the gaze establishing the representation. 
This always present alternative position within the imaginary allows the subject to 
continually evade the gaze, calling into question Hebdige’s claim that Punk style is 
nothing more than “graffiti on prisons walls.” The prison walls which Hebdige sees 
constructing the very being of his subjects are, for the Punks, nothing more than an 
illusion, a graphic effect. They are not some terrible structure that can only be escaped 
from in the imaginary. Or as Copjec explains,
Where the film-theoretical positions [of Althusser and Hebdige] always tends to trap the 
subject in representation, to conceive of language as constructing the prison walls of the 
subject’s being, Lacan argues that the subject sees these walls as trompe I’oeii, and as 
being constructed by something beyond them. For beyond everything that is displayed to 
the subject, the question is asked, ‘What is being concealed from me? What in this graphic 
space does not show, does not stop not writing itself.(Copjecl994:34)
From this discussion an alternative conception of the subject is offered by Lacan, 
one which illustrates a radical authenticity to subculture missed in Hebdige’s text.
How does Lacan offer authenticity where Hebdige found a surface expression of style? 
Lacan’s conception of the subject is beyond signification; it is a lack in the symbolic 
system impossible to signify. To return our own gaze to the diagram described above, 
we must also include the notion of the screen. For Lacan the idea of a screen upon 
which the representation of the gaze is projected in a graphic presentation accounts for
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the subject’s misrecognition of itself in representation. In this case, Hebdige’s text acts 
as the screen upon which the image of subculture captured by the theoretical camera is 
represented. When confronted by this image, rather than seeing itself the subject sees 
an image, an image from which it can immediately escape due to the possibility of 
always imagining a different perspective from the one caught in the camera. At the 
moment the subject intuits that something is missing from its image as it is represented 
on the screen, and in Hebdige’s text, Lacan’s attention is captured. Lacan looks for that 
which is not revealed, for that which is invisible in the graphic field, thus locating the 
emergence of the subject in its representation as an impossibility. The subject is 
always present in its absence, in the “unrealizable ideal” of the symbolic system to 
signify reality. Copjec describes this strange contradiction as follows:
One would expect to find at the point of the [Lacanian] gaze a signified, but here the 
signifier is absent - and so is the subject. The subject, in short, cannot be located or locate 
itself at the point of the gaze, since this point marks its very annihilation. At the moment 
the gaze is discerned, the image, the entire visual field, takes on a terrifying alterity. It 
loses its ‘belong-to-me aspect’ and suddenly assumes the function o f a 
screen.(Copjecl994:35)
So rather than seeing one’s self represented by a theoretical apparatus seeking to reveal 
ones subjectivity, one sees a picture of oneself obviously taken from a particular 
perspective that is not one’s own. Just as one never really believes the voice one hears 
on the answering machine is the voice with which one speaks, or that their image 
presented to them in a snap shot is what they actually look like, the subject never 
believes its representation is its own. So if  one is to look for the subject one does not 
look for a signifier, one looks for an absence covered over by signification.
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This conception of the subject has a profound impact for our understanding of 
subculture. If the signifiers of difference do not signify a subject occupying an identity 
category then what are they doing? What is difference, and what is identity if we 
cannot ground the signifier to an essential entity such as a body? The answer to these 
question lies in the field of representation, because for Lacan, that is all there is; there 
is nothing beyond the visual field of signifiers.
Lacan argues that beyond the signifying network, beyond the visual field, there is, in feet 
nothing at all. The veil o f representation actually conceals nothing; there is nothing behind 
representation....Lacan locates the cause of being in the inform: the unformed (that which 
has no signified, no significant shape in the visual field) and the inquiry (the question posed 
to representation’s presumed reticence). The subject is the effect of the impossibility of 
seeing what is lacking in the representation, what the subject, therefore, wants to see. The 
gaze, the object-cause o f desire, is the object-cause of the subject of desire in the field of 
the visible.(Copjecl994:35)
Lacan’s conception of the subject allows us to see identity in exactly the ways Hebdige 
prevents. From the Lacanian perspective identity is nothing more than a stylistic 
arrangement in a visual field of desire. This visual field is not penetrable by a gaze, 
“Not filled with knowledge or recognition; it is clouded and turned back on itself, 
absorbed in its own enjoyment.”(Copjecl994:36) In this new light Hebdige’s apology 
takes on a new significance. Rather than apologizing to his subjects out of a sense of 
guilt for exposing them, Hebdige is apologizing, as he should, for his failure to allow 
the subject to speak and thus reject his representation. When given the message these 
subjects would have carried it is all too clear why Hebdige could not allow their voices 
into his text. If Hebdige had listened to these subjects he would have to locating 
himself in their gaze, and to do that would involve risking his own unified position as a 
subject in his text. He would have to admit that he to was being gazed upon by subjects
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with the ability to dismantle the component parts of his identity. This is a risk he could 
not take, for to do so would be to admit his own dissolution.
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Chapter Three: 
Reification or Relief?
Another approach to the analysis of identity that involves the commodity form is 
seen in the work of Ann Bolin. In ‘Transcending and Transgendering: Male-to-female 
Transexuals, Dichotomy and Diversity’, an article from Gilbert Herdt’s edited volume 
Third Sex, Third Gender, Bolin analyzes the practices of cross-dressers and 
transsexuals. The intent is to evaluate the implications of these practices for our 
understanding of gender. According to Bolin the identities expressed by cross-dressers 
“destablize” our gender categories, potentially opening a space for the development of 
subjectivity free from the constraints of what she calls the “western gender paradigm.” 
This paradigm manifests an ideology that explains social roles in terms of biological 
sex. Within this ideology the behavior associated with masculinity and femininity is 
understood as being perfectly natural because it follows from our body’s physical 
characteristics. Those who possess a female anatomy express the feminine gender role 
because gendered behavior is assumed to be linked to anatomy. This results in the 
assumption that one’s gender follows from his or her sex. Our identity categories 
reflect this cultural truth with femininity and masculinity being recognized as the 
expression of our body’s biological make-up.
Integral to this paradigm is a binary conception of gender. We assume there are 
only two genders following from two biological sexes. Bolin articulates the practices
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of the transgender community (the self-describing phrase used by cross-dressers and 
others who express gender variation) as subverting this ideology, as breaking down the 
associative links upon which the paradigm is based. The practice of cross-dressing 
“unsettles” the ideological link between gender and sex by juxtaposing the signifiers of 
one gender with the anatomical features of the other sex. The effect is the graphic 
depiction of the mutual independence of these two characteristics of identity. When 
gender is freed from sex the identity categories (such as male and female) are unsettled. 
The categories are shown to rest upon culturally constructed presumptions rather than 
essential characteristics of the physical body. According to Bolin this subversion calls 
for the recognition of a third and possibily more gender categories since the identity 
being expressed by the transgender(ist) does not correspond to his or her sex. Breaking 
the link between identity and the physical characteristics of the body forces the re­
definition of our gender categories and the recognition that gender is a construct 
independent of sex. This allows gender to be based on properties other than those 
associated with the biological body, opening the possibility of articulating the existence 
of a third gender category corresponding to the identities expressed by the transgender 
community. Describing these identities as a third gender “opens a new cultural space” 
in which a transgendered identity can develop, freeing the subject from the constraints 
of a binary gender paradigm. This removes the transgender(ist) from the margins of 
society, providing liberation for those whose identity cannot be reduced to the binary 
term of the gender paradigm.
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In Bolin’s account she does not see the practices of the transgender community 
challenging gender as a defining characteristic of being. The transgender community is 
described as requiring a reconsideration of what constitutes gender by calling into 
question the contents and form of our gender categories. Transgendered identities 
leave gender as a signified object intact while challenging our paradigmatic 
understanding of gender as binary. It is my hypothesis that this conclusion is 
problematic. I plan to show that cross-dressing has nothing to do with liberation, and 
that a subversion of ideology does not take place in the practices of the transgender 
community. Rather, as articulated by Bolin the practices of the transgender community 
reify the western binary gender paradigm. Consequently, Bolin’s reading of the 
transgender community must be understood as portraying the cross-dressed subject as a 
prisoner trapped within the social categories she/he seeks to transcend. I claim the 
practices of the transgender community need to be read in a different light. In doing so 
an understanding of cross-dressing can be developed that approaches the practice from 
outside the political framework established by Bolin. Approaching the practice of 
cross-dressing from outside the identity politics of Bolin reconfigures our 
understanding of the subject who cross-dresses. It is my goal to develop an 
understanding of the transgender community’s practices that does not portray their 
expressions of subjectivity as being motivated by a political agenda, nor as a 
reification, but as a practice organized by an economy of enjoyment.
In order to understand how Bolin’s study misses it mark, producing a portrait of 
the subject as trapped, as opposed to liberated, we need to look at the relationship
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posited between the signifiers of gender and ideology. This project returns to the place 
of the commodity in the construction of identity because the signifiers of gender, in this 
case, are commodities. Reading Bolin’s work in conjunction with Hebdige’s provides 
a contrasting view of the commodity’s role in the construction of identity since her 
understanding of subculture is exactly opposite to that of Hebdige’s. For Bolin the 
social actor can subvert the dominant social structure by rearranging the signifiers of 
his or her identity. In Hebdige’s terms this amounts to the transgender community 
making the signifier ‘signify and signify again as something di£ferent’(Hebdigel979:3): 
a third gender. This indicates a radically different understanding of identity since it 
posits the agency of the subject as providing the means to subvert the dominant social 
order. Bolin sees the subject as defining their own identity through the establishment 
of the meaning of the signifiers used to express their identity.
For Bolin, the subject of subculture does exactly what Hebdige said it couldn’t. 
The gestures of cross-dressers do signal “a refusal and resistance to society’s 
dominant”; with their actions not just “ending in style”(Hebdigel979:3), as Hebdige 
would have us believe. As articulated by Bolin the practices of the transgender 
community amount to much more than “the expression of the darker side of sets of 
regulations”(Hebdige1979:3). For Bolin their stylistic arrangements actually provide 
an alternative to current social relationships by graphically depicting a different set of 
principles upon which social organization can be based. Whereas for Hebdige these 
arrangements amount to nothing but “just so much graffiti on a prison 
wall”.(Hebdigel979:3) To follow this metaphor, Bolin describes the transgender
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community as having jumped the prison walls by “magically appropriating” the 
“humble objects” of the dominant. Putting these objects to their own use, the 
transgender community transforms the meaning of these objects as well as their identity 
into structures that are marching as well as dancing in the street. And the “humble 
objects” of the dominant, such as articles of clothing or images of the ideal somatic 
form, in which Hebdige found nothing more than the signifiers of continued 
domination are providing the tools for resistance. In order to understand how Bolin 
was able to draw these conclusions we need to examine the structure of her argument. 
By carefully recounting Bolin’s steps we can explore the assumptions and conceptions 
that provide the back-bone of her argument, exposing the moment in which Bolin’s 
understanding of the subject is infused with something more that enables it to almost 
magically transcend social domination. This will lead back to the place of the 
commodity form in the construction of identity, since in Bolin’s argument, the 
commodity provides the key to the transgender community’s ability to subvert the 
dominant gender paradigm.
The first step in Bolin’s argument calls for expanding our identity categories to 
include the possibility of “supernumerary” genders. According to Bolin we need to 
include the possibility of more than two genders if we are to theorize intersubjective 
relationships outside the “Euro-American” gender paradigm. This argument is based 
on the subversive potential of constructing identities that confirm the independence of 
sex from gender. Such an identity is illustrated by Karen, one of Bolin’s informants, 
who states:
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To use the more common terminology, I would say I am transgendered. I cross-dress but 
not for sexual display or attraction. There is a feeling that is feminine, pretty and 
desirable. Yet, I don’t change as a ‘person’. My gestures and walk are compatible with a 
feminine appearance, but not exaggerated, my voice unchanged. I don’t consider myself a 
different person, just another visage or aspect of the same person... At times I prefer 
feminine gestures and expressions, but more often masculine responses. When societal 
binarism insists I choose one pole or the other, I choose masculine. I have been raised as a 
male, my sexual anatomy is male, etc. Nonetheless, I insist that I am ‘ambigenderal.’ I 
claim all gender space, if you will, and exist within this spectrum at different points at 
different times.(Bolinl994:465)
Karen’s identity signals subversion because it challenges the ideology that necessitates 
a link between sex and gender. She has re-arranged the signifiers of sex and gender to 
construct an identity that, strictly speaking, is neither male nor female. Karen has the 
anatomy of a biological male but elects a social persona based on context. Her chosen 
persona does not necessarily follow her anatomical sex yet at times it does, expressing 
a fluidity to gender. Karen expresses her chosen persona by assembling the signifiers 
of the feminine gender and arranging them in such a way that she becomes socially 
female. She is able to re-define and hence change her social identity by assembling and 
arranging such signifiers of gender as articles of clothing, gestures, hairstyles, and 
expressions into a form that emulates femininity.
In the process of assembling the signifiers of femininity and juxtaposing them 
with the signifiers of the opposite sex both sets of signifiers gain new meanings, 
challenging the assumption that the signifiers of gender, such as hairstyle, behavior, or 
clothing, correspond with sexual identity. The objects signifying gender are shown to 
represent something different when known to be arranged by choice. Gender becomes 
performative with the collection of signifiers that operate as props reflecting the 
demands of social convention as opposed to an essential quality of the body. The actor
39
consciously manipulates the signifiers of gender to re-assign their meanings. By re­
assigning the meaning of the signifier the signified object, gender is re-defined as well. 
In this case one’s gender is shown to exist along a continuum, as a matter of degree 
along a fluid scale as opposed to the concrete terms of the western gender paradigm.
Re-arranging the signifiers of gender in such a way that their meaning is re­
assigned expresses identities that cannot be assimilated into the existing categories of 
our gender paradigm, producing ambiguous identities. We speak of such identities as 
ambiguous because what is being expressed is neither male nor female, it is something 
else, something is not recognized in our gender categories. The collection of signifiers 
assembled by Karen are unintelligible, they deny our ideological understanding that 
gender is binary. Rather, they express a continuum that allows Karen to claim all 
gender space. Karen’s “choice” in social role unsettles the dominant gender paradigm, 
forcing a reconceptualization of our gender categories. For Bolin Karen’s choice in 
gender role is subversive because it demonstrates the independence of gender from sex, 
calling into question the capabilities of a binary paradigm to explain social identity and 
role in terms of biological sex.
For Bolin this “unsettling” of the gender paradigm is the first step towards the 
development of new identity categories that do not depend on an alignment between 
sex and gender. The construction of new identities is possible at this point in time 
because as Karen illustrates the paradigmatic understanding of gender as being linked 
to sex has been broken. Since this link is broken it is now possible to conceptualize a 
third gender category that removes the constraints on subjectivity imposed by an
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ideology that grounds gender in sex. This allows for theorizing intersubjective social 
relationships absent of the limitations exacted by a binary conception of gender. The 
recognition of a third possibility leads to liberation for those who “fall between the 
cracks” of the western binary gender paradigm by providing an identity category 
corresponding to their experience as subjects. Having a social category to describe 
such an identity enables the development of alternative subjectivities to those currently 
recognized by our binary gender system. Recognition signals liberation since those 
whose presence was previously denied are given the opportunity to develop free from 
the constraints of an ideology that continually erases their presence. Bolin sees the 
transgender community as being engaged in the process of defining themselves as a 
viable alternative to our identity categories based on sex. Bolin refers to this as a 
project of “cultur-ing”; claiming it exemplifies the creating of “new forms, and seeing 
new relationships in social forms as identities.”(Bolinl994:477) The result is the 
emergence and development of new identities where formerly there were none.
The analogy of the closet, in which prior to “coming out” an identity is present 
but denied, is a fitting description of Bolin’s understanding of the emergence of 
transgendered identity. For Bolin, before the break-down of the gender paradigm, 
transgendered identities existed but could not be described as legitimate expressions of 
subjectivity. Prior to the described “cultur-ing” project those who are now considered 
transgendered either hid their subjectivity in the closet or were considered to be 
afflicted with a pathological disorder. This is made clear by Bolin who states:
Ten years ago male-to-female transsexualism supported the binary gender schema by 
dividing gender-dysphorie individuals into men and women where transvestites were 
considered sick or pathological men and transsexuals were women on whom nature had 
erred. In contrast, the recently emerging transgendered identity offers an account of
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gender as a social product by giving one the option of living as a woman or a blend 
without surgical reassignment. The possible permutations within transgenderism are 
innumerable and lay bare the point that gender is not biology but is socially 
produced.(Bolinl994:482)
This example shows how subject positions, such as those of the transgender 
community, can be present but denied visibility by an ideological system. Once the 
influence of ideology is removed what was once regarded as a gender “disorder” is 
reconfigured as the expression of a legitimate identity. Describing the subjectivity of 
the transgender community as the expression of a third gender category transforms 
what was once actively erased, or austracized from society into a valid identity.
The second step in Bolin’s argument exposes the mechanics of the ideology that 
links sex to gender. She historicizes its development, making it clear that such 
categories as masculine or feminine are not universal. We see this effort in Bolin’s 
claim that the idea of “two genders founded on two biological sexes” only began to 
predominate during the eighteenth centuiy. The emphasis Bolin places on the 
historicity of gender and its accompanying categories is further illuminated by her 
statement that reads: “Perhaps the task of the twenty-first-century scholar will be to 
deconstruct the social history of a tri-gender paradigm whose awakenings began in the 
1990s.”(Bolinl994:485) The effect of histroricizing our understanding of gender as a 
binary system is to show that such categories as male or female are neither universal 
nor timeless. Rather, these categories are descriptive terms for a historically and 
culturally specific social organizations. Incorporating this knowledge into our 
understanding of identity brings the inherent instability of gender as a paradigm, no 
matter how many categories are recognized, to the forefront of our awareness.
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Although she does not go so far as to say gender should be done away with altogether 
as a concept for understanding social organization, Bolin does continually trouble 
gender and its accompanying categories as they exist within the Euro-American binary 
paradigm. The effect is to destabilize the categories while retaining gender as an object 
around which subjectivity is organized universally. This is illustrated by her 
expectation that her “tri-gender” paradigm will be deconstructed in the future. For 
Bolin gender categories can always be taken apart to expose and undo the ideological 
matrix informing the category’s meaning yet are needed to understand social 
organization cross-culturally. Bolin refers to the process as a “deconstruction”1 since 
the transgendered identity illuminates the necessary conditions demanded by ideology 
for the construction of a meaningful gender identity. We can speak of ideology as 
necessitating a link between sex and gender because, as was illustrated above by Karen, 
when sex and gender are not aligned we are faced with a conundrum. When the 
conditions necessitated by ideology for inclusion within a social category such as 
gender are not met, we do not know what to call that person.
The mandated link between sex and gender is seen in conceptions of 
reproduction. Common-sensically the reproduction of society is dependent on the 
reproduction of individuals, and the reproduction of individuals involves the sexual
1 It is important to note that I am using the term “deconstruction” as it is employed by Bolin, and not in the 
strict definition o f the term as it has been established by Derrida. The importance o f making this distinction 
is to avoid a lengthy discussion o f Bolin’s use o f the term. It is my belief that if one were to return to 
Derrida’s texts, the context in which Bolin employs this term could be exposed as erroneous. The “logos” 
and the dependence of western metaphysics upon it, the exposure o f which is the job of deconstruction, is 
not congruent with the term ideology as it is used in Bolin’s text. An exploration o f the implications of 
conflating the dependency of western metaphysics on logocentrism and the importance o f ideology in 
defining common conceptions of gender could be another paper.
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coupling of a man and a woman. Yet, to be a “man” or to be a “woman” is more than 
a matter of anatomy. To be a man, or to be a woman, involves behavior: one needs to 
be masculine or feminine as well as possess the proper anatomical features. An 
essential component of being masculine or feminine involves the erotic attraction to the 
opposite sex. Without this heterosexual attraction one is not recognized as truly being 
a man or a woman. This establishes the reproduction of heterosexuality as an integral 
part of our understanding of physical reproduction. Our understanding of physical 
reproduction not only reproduces the species but the behaviors associated with 
heterosexuality. The individuals we reproduce socially follow the formulaic 
association between heterosexuality and reproduction, with gender roles stemming 
from heterosexual reproduction. This conflation indicates the presence of ideology 
because we consider it perfectly natural that individuals are sexually attracted to the 
opposite sex, and when they are not there is confusion. The mandatory link between 
heterosexuality and gender in the categories male and female is described by Bolin as 
follows:
In the western paradigm, gender operates as ‘the central organizing principle’ of sexuality 
and sexual orientation exists only in relationship to gender and physiology. ‘Males’ are 
expected to be men: tough, strong behavior is not enough unless they are also attracted to 
women as sexual partners. Thus heterosexuality is a major component o f ‘normal’ gender 
expression. (Bolinl 994:485)
To illustrate how the transgender community “deconstructs” the dominant gender 
paradigm Bolin draws from individuals whose identities push the gender paradigm 
beyond its limits. Examples include a the male-to-female transvestite who claims a 
lesbian sexual orientation, and a female-to-male transsexual who considers herself
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lesbian. The ambiguity of such an identity stems from their failure to follow the 
formulaic association expected by ideology. These individuals remain unassimilable in 
the gender paradigm, providing an example of how ideology mandates a connection 
between specific signified attributes for the production of a legitimate identity.
We can see this “deconstruction” in action by examining the case of Jane, a late- 
thirtyish transgender(ist). Jane’s identity “deconstructs” our gender categories because 
in Jane’s identity we can see the conditions ideology demands for inclusion in a gender 
category.
Jane lives as a woman with “her” wife Mary. They were married when Jane was John, and 
over the course o f time John has become femininzed with hormones, electrolysis and 
hairstyle. Although this has caused problems in the marriage, Mary has continued to try 
and accept these changes. John is still able to engage in intercourse, as the hormones have 
not yet interfered with the capacity for erection, although this will eventually happen. This 
case illustrates how Western gender terminology, which is so reliant on biological insignia, 
becomes incoherent when the genitalism of the gender paradigm is revoked...Mary regards 
herself as heterosexual in orientation, although she defines sexual intimacy with her spouse 
Jane as somewhere between lesbian and heterosexual.(Bolinl994:484)
Jane “deconstructs” the western gender paradigm by pointing out the ideologically 
necessary link between the biological body, sexual practice, and behavior for the 
production of a meaningful identity. In deffering from the standard relationship 
between these three terms she illuminates the dependence of our gender categories on 
their connection.
For Bolin, Jane illustrates the process through which ideology brings an object 
into view. Ideology provides a descriptive category corresponding to that object, 
instituting the cultural significance of that object as it is described. Bolin’s conception 
of ideology can be likened to a lens that focuses ones eye, establishing that which is 
relevant by providing a signifier to describe that object. The lens brings gender into
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view, establishing, among other tilings, the behaviors associated with heterosexual 
eroticism as one of its signiflers. These signifiers are then placed in a descriptive 
framework in which the relationship between the object and its signifiers becomes 
seamless. In this case ideology infuses such signifiers as the genitalia, body shape, 
dress, and hairstyle with significance by linking them to the object gender in 
descriptive categories representative of that object. The lens of ideology illuminates 
the essence of the object as being aligned with the essence of the social category 
describing the object. The signifiers assembled by the transgender(ist), such as 
homosexual eroticism, the development of breasts on a male body, or the stylistic 
display of androgyny express ambiguity since these signifiers do not correlate with the 
social categories representing the object, gender. Since there is no categoiy to 
correspond with these signifiers, the subjectivity of those who express themselves with 
these signifiers is relegated to the nether regions of scientific speculation and obscurity.
The effect of ideology is seen in the classification given to gender variants in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (or DSM-lUR for short) - the 
diagnostic hand-book for mental illness used by the medical community. Tracy, a self 
identified transvestite, describes how ideology operates to relegate those whose identity 
does not correspond with the established social categories to the margins of society. 
Tracy’s words also provide a graphic description of the changes in our understanding of 
gender brought abo ut by the gradual erosion of the ideology that links the specific 
social categories with the body.
There[in the DSM-HIR] we are listed as transvestic fetishists, right there with the sado- 
masochists,..child molesters and...aggressive butt-rubbers. We are summarily dismissed as 
deviants rather than variants in Western society. The alternative is to be transsexual or 
gender dysphoric - i.e., gender identity disorder of adolescence and adulthood, non-
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transsexual type. Now is that a mouthfiil? An obvious exaggerated attempt to force 
people into a category. George Orwell would be delighted.(in Bolinl 994:473)
Tracy’s description of our changing understanding of gender also exemplifies the 
definition of ideology being put forward by Bolin. As can be seen, ideology for Bolin 
is not invisible or unconscious, as it is for Hebdige. Ideology is profoundly visible and 
profoundly conscious. We can see this in the fact that Tracy is aware of “Western 
thoughts exaggerated attempt to force people into a category”. Ideology is not infusing 
the space between the signifier and the object. The meaning of the signifier is found in 
the category describing the object, and not by its position in relation to other signifiers. 
To use Barthes’ terms, Bolin does not find a second order semiological system infusing 
the signifier with meaning. For Bolin the signifiers of gender always signify gender, 
but in the case of the transgender community the gender that is signified does not 
correspond with the categories “male” and “female” as they are socially constructed in 
western society. The category describing the object is where ideology works its magic, 
creating a seamless web of significance between the categories of a socially 
constructed reality and the material world. Bolin’s conception of the relationship 
between the signifier and ideology is important to my reading of her work since it 
determines the image of the subject as it is represented in her text.
The position Bolin would like to press home is that identity categories, such as 
sex and gender, are historical constructs describing the symbolic expression of a 
specific social organization. These categories seem eternal because ideology operates 
to naturalize the social relationships they describe through the universalist terms of
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biology. It is important to question Bolin’s conception of ideology by asking what the 
signifiers of our identity categories are. This question brings Bolin’s conception of the 
subject to the forefront, since there is something about the signifier and the process of 
assembling signifiers to express identity that allows Bolin to read the practices of the 
transgender community as liberatory. The investigation of this relationship moves the 
discussion away from a description of Bolin’s work and towards a critical reading of 
her text because she finds something more in the signifiers of gender than the 
expression of identity. This “something more” is the focus of my inquiry and serves as 
a point of departure for an alternate reading of the transgender community’s practices - 
a reading that views gender not as an object but as a sign.
The “something more” Bolin finds in the signifiers of gender is the logic of the 
commodity form. Bolin finds the signifiers of gender to possess a use-value that 
provides the means to unravel ideology. We can see the logic of the commodity form 
entering into Bolin’s understanding of the signifiers of gender in her description of the 
position anthropological and historical knowledge of gender occupy in the transgender 
community. It is Bolin’s understanding that the transgender community relies on 
anthropology’s conception of cultural relativism and historical reconstructions of the 
past to legitimize their own experience as subjects in contemporary American society. 
The quintessential example of this is seen in the explanation of the role played by the 
Berdache in the transgender community. According to Bolin the Berdache tradition is 
used as a model for the development of a transgendered identity. As Bolin states, the 
Berdache tradition is used by the transgender and gay community as a source of identity
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as well as pride, providing a cultural instance of a legitimate third gender that is 
recognized both historically and culturally. In this third category the transgender 
community supposedly sees biological males living as social females, complete with 
recognized status and rank. As described by Bolin, for the transgender community the 
identity of the Berdache represents a historical and cultural example in which our 
society’s gender paradigm is shown to be lacking in descriptive capabilities for those 
individuals who are neither male nor female, but something else. Those who are 
something else are given a societal space within the Berdache category, which can be 
understood as a cultural instance of a third gender. In this example we see Bolin 
viewing anthropological knowledge as providing the raw material to be used for the 
construction of a legitimate third gender categoiy.
This is indicative of “something more” entering into Bolin’s understanding of 
cross-dressing because no longer are the transgender community’s actions understood 
as representative of social processes. Once the transgender community is understood as 
using anthropological knowledge for the construction of identity, they become actors 
making informed choices for the attainment of a specific end. The transgender(ist) is 
no longer manipulating the contents of our gender categories, they are consuming 
signifiers for the attainment of a use-value. In this case the use-value of 
anthropological knowledge is its ability to aid in die dismantling of the western binary 
gender paradigm by providing the means to see through ideology.
The complexity of this logic is depicted by Bolin’s statement that reads:
It is not surprising that the cross-cultural record and anthropology’s relativism have been 
included in the social construction of gender variant identities by the organizational 
gatekeepers of the gender community.... Anthropological as well as historical data are 
reinterpreted as part of the roots and developing empowerment of the transgendered
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community. Interestingly what seems to be happening is an integration and valuing of the 
anthropological concept o f relativism, that is, the recognition that culture is an important 
component in the construction of gender ideologies, identities and statuses.... By using 
the Berdache as a model, the transgender community and homosexual community become 
active participants in reshaping their culture and in finding affiliation where division 
existed(Bolin1994:475)
What is important to recognize is the relationship posited by Bolin between the 
signifier, the subject, and ideology. In the above passage we can glean how Bolin’s 
particular conception of the signifier and of its capacity to signify identity defines a 
particular conception of the subject. The subject is agential, capable of seeing culture 
as a determinant in the formation of ideology, and to strategize accordingly in the 
construction of new identity categories. The subject is not blinded by ideology to the 
true implications of their use of commodified signifiers as Hebdiged understands the 
punks to be. The subject is a consumer of the lexicon of signifiers representing gender 
in his or her cultural surroundings. The act of consumption is guided by the usefulness 
of specific signifiers for the construction of a new identity. The legitimacy of this 
construction comes from the further consumption of the promised use-values of 
anthropological and historical knowledge. The consumption of anthropology and 
history provides historical and cultural instances that can serve as precedence for the 
inclusion of non-binary sexual identity in society’s categories. Legitimacy does not 
come from the trace of a real or historically “true” set of social relations contained in 
the signifiers of identity. It comes from having an outside authority such as an 
anthropologist or historian recognize your actions as operateing in excess of the 
western gender paradigm. The anthropologist’s authority comes from his or her role as
50
producers of knowledge, making them expert on the knowledge consumed since they 
produced it.
By positing knowledge of genders history as useful Bolin automatically enters 
into the logic of the commodity form. This logic depicts the subject as an agential 
consumer of relativism for the purpose of seeing through the dominant gender 
paradigm. The use-value of relativism is the capacity to dismantle the ideology of the 
western binary gender paradigm by providing a perspective that lets it be seen as one 
arrangement among many. The particular ideology of the western gender paradigm can 
then be dismantled through the further consumption of gender signifiers. Once this 
logic is in place the signifiers of gender, such as dress, hairstyle, or behavior, can be 
exploited for their use-value to dismantle gender as a binary system. This logic 
explains the role given to the commodity form itself, as a material object acting as a 
signifier, in the emergence of transgendered identities by Bolin.
In order to understand the role of the commodity form in the emergence of 
transgendered identities we need to return to Bolin’s description of how the transgender 
community has been able to emerge at this point in time as a legitimate identity. And 
according to Bolin this has been the direct result of changes in our conceptions of 
femininity in the late twentieth century. As she states: “Conventional femininity in the 
late twentieth century is in a process of re-definition socially, economically and 
especially important, somatically.”(Bolinl994:478). This leads to an overall 
redefinition of the ideal feminine form. Bolin posits changes in the ideal feminine 
body form as stemming from “a world wide movement towards health and fitness”
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which has replaced the “very thin silhouette ideal of the 1960s” with the empowered 
physique of the female athlete. This “revised feminine body ideal” establishes “toned 
muscles and taut physiques”(Bolinl994:478) as a definitional characteristic of 
femininity, resulting in the undermining of the assumption that a particular body form 
equates with a particular gender. Today muscularity is no longer viewed as a trait 
reserved for men. “Women body builders, long-distance runners, and mountain 
climbers, create new embodiments of femininity that defy the traditional soma of 
woman as soft and curvaceous.”(Bolinl994:478) The development of these new forms 
breaks the bio-centric ideology that necessitates a link between particular body shapes 
and gender. With this break comes the possibility of “a social woman with a 
penis”(Bolin: 1994:479) since the mandate that gender follow sex has been gradually 
eroded away by changing conceptions of the ideal feminine body form.
As Bolin sees it the commodity form is responsible for these changes in the image 
of the body forms associated with our gender categories. Literally, changes in the look 
of masculinity and femininity can be traced to its representation in the mass media 
since advertisements and fashion magazines reflect the ideal shape of a masculine or 
feminine body as it is configured socially. This “ideal shape” becomes the 
embodiment of gender since, by association, to be masculine or feminine is to possess 
the body representative of these categories. For Bolin changes in the image of the ideal 
body shape of masculinity or femininity are crucial to the emergence of transgendered 
identity since these changes can either facilitate or establishes a formidable barrier to 
those who wish to live socially as the opposite gender. And in the late twentieth-
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centuiy changes in the image of the ideal feminine body form have facilitated those 
who wish to live socially as female but possess the anatomy of a male. This is made 
clear by Kathy, “a petit middle-aged cross-dresser”, who states:
The women I have always found attractive and try to emulate are assertive, self-sufficient, 
and emotionally and physically strong. This body type and personality type have become 
increasingly accepted. The image I portray is essentially that o f an alert, athletic, highly 
trained female body builder. Acceptance by society of this type o f woman has benefited me 
greatly. Ten years ago, there were no female body types such as mine thought to be 
attractive. Cory Everson, Florence Griffith Joyner, and others have broken new ground.(in 
Bolinl 994:479)
As Kathy’s statement indicates, recent changes in the ideal form of the feminine 
body have facilitated the development of transgendered identities by providing a form 
biological males can easily emulate. Biological males can now more easily “pass” as 
social females because the ideal body type of femininity has become more man-like.
For Bolin the recent emergence of the transgender community can be directly attributed 
to these changes affecting the ideal feminine soma as it is represented in commodity 
forms. Quite literally, in the late twentieth century, changes in the definition of the 
ideal form of femininity have enabled biological men to more easily occupy that form. 
Ease of emulation has resulted in an increased number of men choosing to live socially 
as women without altering their bodies surgically or hormonally. The increased 
occupation of the feminine form by biological males has produced a situation where 
our conventional gender categories are challenged by identities that do not conform to 
the socially established parameters. The result is the break down of the western gender 
paradigm since a biological male who lives socially as a female expresses an identity 
that confirms the independence of sex from gender.
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Bolin sees the subversive potential of this act lying in its ability to subvert the 
social order by deactivating gender as a principle for social organization. Jason 
Cromwell makes this clear when he states: “To acknowledge the validity of ‘men with 
vaginas’ and (‘women with penises’) would be to admit that men as well as women 
could resist and thus, subvert the social order, by approximating the ‘other’ but never 
fully becoming the ‘other’.”(Cromwell in Bolinl994:485) The importance of changing 
conceptions of the ideal feminine or masculine body shape for the emergence of “men 
with vaginas” is made clear by Bolin who states:
The androgynous-appearing soma of some women athletes combines symbols of 
masculinity and femininity on a physical level... .It may be assumed that the relaxing of 
bodily gender rules and the undermining of the biological paradigm since the 1960s 
[because of the increased popularity of such activities as body-building, mountain 
climbing, and long distance running among women] has undoubtedly contributed to the 
trend toward a transgendered community and the creation of nonsurgical transsexuals.
Such transformations of the female body erode constructs o f behaviors and bodies as 
natural by creating the possibility for a social woman with a penis. (Bolinl 994:479)
In this example the commodity form is acting as a catalyst, providing the means 
for the transgendered individual to emerge from the margins of society. In the 
commodity form Bolin finds the signifiers defining the look of gender as well as the 
objects providing the means for attaining that look and inclusion in the category. We 
see this in the emulation of the ideal body form of femininity by men who wish to live 
socially as women as well as in the assemblage of commodities whose use as 
accessories completes the transformation from being male to socially female. Once 
these signifiers are assembled the binary gender paradigm automatically unravels from 
within.
54
The problem with finding revolutionary potential in “the new images of the ideal 
feminine body form” disseminated in the mass media is that these images are infused 
with ideological significance. These images are part of what Theodore Adorno has 
labeled “the culture industry” and have been shown to define the experience of 
occupying such categories as male and female.(see Adorno: 1991) Adorno has shown 
that these images not only work to define who is included in such social categories but 
to define the meaning of being included in such categories as well. Bolin is prevented 
from seeing this because she is blind to the logic of the commodity form. She doesn’t 
see the social relationships expressed by the commodity as being indicative of a 
separate logic. The commodity does not have a fetishistic nature for Bolin. Its 
meaning is established in a democratic process and does not express a larger set of 
social relationships than those expressed in the contents of its form. Is it possible that 
an anatomical male embodying the ideal form of femininity does not represent the 
unraveling of the gender paradigm but the opposite, its reification? In order to 
understand how this might be we need to turn to the work of Susan Willis, who outlines 
the problem of dissociating the evolution of body forms and their accompanying 
images from ideological systems that define the meaning of the such categories as 
“masculinity” and “femininity”. Upon reading Willis, it becomes apparent that Bolin’s 
“deconstruction” of gender fails due to a misrecognition of the relationship between the 
commodity and ideology. As a result, Bolin fails to recognize the body as a site of 
reification and the possibility that body forms can become commodified. This 
misrecognition results in her failure to realize that the practices of the transgender
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community actually perpetuates the very ideological structures from which Bolin 
claims they are liberated.
Bolin’s failure can be attributed to her seduction by the logic of the commodity 
form, becoming fascinated by the form’s content, ignoring the logic that gives form to 
this content. Remaining immersed in the logic of the form’s content prevents her from 
seeing the images she envisions as providing the means for the emergence and 
development of transgendered identities as images produced to enhance consumption 
and to normalize a particular social organization that continually defines gender as an 
attribute of the physical body. This failure can be seen in Bolin’s statement that reads:
The growing transgender community has also been influenced by changes and challenges 
to embodiments of femininity. Conventional femininity in the late twentieth century is in a 
process of redefinition socially, economically and, especially important to this essay, 
somatically....A world-wide movement toward health and fitness has resulted in a revised 
feminine body ideal that includes toned muscles and taut physiques. Women body 
builders’ stout muscles, previously relegated as a trait reserved for men, have begun to 
undermine bio-centric ideologies and equations o f muscularity and 
manliness.(Bolinl994:478)
By positing these changes in the shape of the ideal feminine soma as the result of social 
revisions in the definition of femininity Bolin is saying the evolution of the ideal 
feminine body form is a democratic process and not mediated or influenced by power.
In ‘Work(ing) Out’, from A Primer for Daily Life, Susan Willis develops an 
argument explaining the evolution of female body forms in terms of expanding 
capitalist markets. Willis describes the specific development of health clubs and the 
“fitness craze” as an advanced form of commodification in which the body, its parts, 
and its shape are transformed into commodities to be sold back to the person as an 
idealized package. This package is marketed as reflecting the look of a “contemporary
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woman” and while expressing an empowered image of women, actually works to 
continue the domination of women by men. Part of this continued domination involves 
determining the qualities and characteristics of femininity. For Willis the 
quintessential example of this is the development of the Nautilus machine and the 
Nautilus work out. The importance of die Nautilus machine lies in its design. 
According to Willis the machine isolates the individual person as well as specific 
muscle groups. As it isolates the individual, the machine “tones to perfection” the 
specific muscle groups whose enhancement is recognized as indicating an ideal form of 
gender. Quite literally the Nautilus workout is designed to produce a specific body 
shape and form while simultaneously producing a particular relationship between the 
self and machine:
When asked to describe the nautilus, most people express similar feelings o f being 
assimilated into the machine. Rather than the direct expenditure of effort out of your 
body, along a wire over a pulley to lift a weight, the nautilus incorporates your body into 
its function. The woman inside the nautilus machine is the object produced by the 
machine even while she is at the same time the producer producing herself as product of 
the machine.(Willisl991:75)
What is important to take from Willis’s statement is the combined production of 
the body as a commodified entity and the relationship of the self to that entity as it is 
mediated by the Nautilus machine. As Willis points out it is a particular form of the 
body that is being sold, and it is a particular relationship between the self and that body 
that is being fostered by the “fitness craze”. This relationship translates the want for a 
physically fit body into the objectification of the individual by the machine producing 
that body. In the Nautilus work-out not only is a specific body form being produced by 
the Nautilus machine, but a particular relationship between the consumer and the
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producer is being cultivated as well. The subject is objectified not only by the machine 
but by the ideology of the producer working to establish the body shape produced by 
their machine as the ideal shape of femininity. The relationship between working out, 
producing the ideal body, and ideology becomes particularly insidious when given the 
association between being fit and being in tune with the body’s “natural” order. The 
product the consumer wishes to consume is the image of the body disseminated by the 
machine’s producer, an image manufactured to sell athletic equipment. In producing 
that body form the individual is transformed into an object of the machine, an object 
whose contours are mediated not only by the machine itself, but by the same 
ideological apparatus that defines the specific characteristics of gender as the 
possession of a particular body form.
So when Willis states: “The workout focuses women’s positive desires for 
strength, agility, and the physical affirmation of self and transforms these into 
competition over style and rivalry for a particular body look and 
performance”(Willisl991:70), it becomes apparent that the image of the “ideal” shape 
of femininity is more complicated than Bolin originally thought. The form of gender 
reflected in the “ideal” shape of the body is part and parcel of the same social process 
that marks specific individuals as gendered then defines a particular look to coincide 
with that gender. This look is grounded in the body by establishing the ultimate 
example of gender as the possession of a particular body shape. This connection 
between body shape and gender serves to reinforce the associative link between gender 
and biological sex by giving currency to the idea that the ultimate signifier of gender is
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the body. The idea that gender and its accompanying categories might be nothing more 
than descriptive terms for specific arrangements of signifiers is undermined. The look 
of gender is shown to be the look of the body, enforcing the associative link between 
the biological body and identity.
What is important to recognize in Willis’s argument is her effort to problematize 
the form of gender while retaining the liberatory aspects of that form’s contents. A 
crucial element of Willis’s argument is the potential “working out” offers for women as 
a liberatory mechanism. Willis refers to this as the “implicit utopian dimension” 
inherent to all mass cultural forms, and is referring to the unintended subversive 
potential of women working out together. The unintended outcome of the 
commodification of women’s bodies is the development of women’s communities 
outside and separate from the household. Going to the gym and working out with a 
collectivly with other women allows the opportunity for camaraderie and consciousness 
raising while engaging in the production of physically powerful bodies. But again the 
point has to be driven home that this is only a potential held within the form. And the 
realization of this potential is continually denied by the mediating influence of 
consumer capitalism and its accompanying ideology. We can see this paradoxical 
situation in Willis’s description of community based exercise programs.
Community sponsored exercise programs do not sever their participants from their lives 
with families and friends. Rather the exercise class creates an opportunity for women to 
develop themselves in community with other women. Such opportunities are absolutely 
negated when exercise is channeled by the media into private living-rooms. The private 
spa, then, offers escape from job or domestic space, but it severely limits the opportunities 
for conversation and community. This is because a woman who participates in aerobics at 
a spa is made to see herself as an isolated individual. The atmosphere of the spa promotes 
an aura of body rivalry. Mirrors are everywhere. Women compare but do not share 
themselves with others. They see themselves as bodies, they scrutinize their lines and 
curves and they check out who is wearing the hottest leotard.(Willisl991:70)
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Can we say that Bolin has misconstrued the utopian dimensions of commodification, 
recognizing the positive potential of new images of the ideal feminine body but is 
denying the mediating influence of ideology?
After reading Willis it becomes apparent that Bolin has confused content with 
form. The form of gender is not troubled by men emulating the ideal feminine body. 
Instead, the ideal, as an object to be emulated for the expression of femininity, is 
reified. The body is made into an object whose form acts as a signifier for the 
expression of femininity. The bodily form of gender, even when occupied by a 
biological male, is not troubled, but objectified. The social processes that establish a 
particular body shape as a definitional characteristic of femininity are not troubled by 
biological men occupying the form. Rather, when a man occupies that form, the form, 
as an indicator of femininity, is depicted as the norm. If  a man who wants to live as a 
social women attains this by emulating the ideal shape of femininity then that shape is 
given currency as an essence of femininity. Femininity becomes associated with a 
particular body shape and possession of that body shape an example of the hyper­
feminine.
We can see how this occurs in the words of one of Bolin’s informants who made 
the following statement in reference to the expected behavioral and sartorial etiquette 
to be upheld at a cross-dresser’s convention.
We are going to enforce our dress and behavior policies ...Evidently there are a few 
uninformed who think hotels allow real women dressed as hookers to troll the 
lobby....please (for all our sakes) use the same taste in attire you would want your sister, 
mother, or your dad, (if he’s one of us) to use. People in [— ] have very definite ideas 
about what a lady should look like. ..help us convince them we are no different from the 
average woman in style of dress.(unknown in Bolinl994:474)
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Bolin’s articulation of cross-dressing does not produce liberated subjects. Rather, 
Bolin’s subjects are reproducing the already reified topological features of gender as 
defined by the dominant ideology. A “deconstruction” has not taken place, and is not 
the goal of the transgender community. Bolin has illustrated how the dominant form of 
femininity can include within its contents a social actor with a penis; or in the case of 
masculinity, social males with vaginas. The practices of the transgender community, 
whether these be surgical and hormonal alterations of the body or sartorial displays, 
leave the dominant gender paradigm intact. And the words of Pat, one of Bolin’s 
informants illustrate this when s/he states:
I currently maintain a full-time androgynous persona, eliciting as many maam’s as I do sir 
responses. My goal is to be free to present myself full female all the time, while still 
expressing a healthy degree of androgyny. Living as a woman gives me a much fuller 
range of expression than as a man. In time, I may feel more comfortable confronting the 
world with the unabashed ambiguity o f total androgyny.(in Bolinl994:465)
The part of the above statement I wish to draw attention to is the perceived 
necessity of confronting the world as either female or male, and the uncomfortable 
feeling elicited by total androgyny. The discomfort of both those confronted by and 
those confronting the world with androgyny illustrates how masculinity and femininity 
remain “active” even in the transgender community’s practices. Might it not be true 
that in a world in which gender is truly deactivated, the androgyn -- as the embodiment 
of all genders -  represents the liberated subject? After all, for the androgyny all gender 
roles are situational and not the embodiment of an ideal that associates surface 
signifiers with an essential quality hidden somewhere in the soma. The fact that the
61
transgender(ists) are striving to “present” themselves as “full time female” (or full time 
male) illustrates the remaining importance of gender for the expression of the self even 
after it has been dissociated from biological sex. This remaining desire for a gendered 
identity signals that “something more” is going on than the “deactivation” of gender a 
in the transgender community’s practices. It is this “something more” that Bolin 
cannot account for with her agential conception of the subject consciously consuming 
the signifiers of gender in order to subvert the dominant gender paradigm. The next 
chapter will develop an approach that can account for this “something more” infusing 
the practice of cross-dressing for the transgender(ist). This will be done by delving into 
the psycho-analytic world of Jaques Lacan.
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Chapter Four: 
Something More
The work of Jaques Lacan provides a theoretical perspective that accounts for the 
“something more” infusing the practices of the transgender community. The presence 
of this “something more” missed by Bolin’s articulation of cross-dressing can be 
accounted for and described by taking into account Lacan’s conception of the subject. 
Approaching the transgender community from a Lacanian perspective necessitates an 
alternative reading of the transgender community’s practices because for Lacan gender 
is not an object that is signified but a sign acquiring meaning from desire. This 
alternative reading moves away from analyzing cross-dressing in political terms and 
approaches the practice as the expression of desire. This shift locates the importance of 
the act in its meaning for the subject and not in the implications of the act for the 
dominant cultural constructions of gender. This allows the practices of the transgender 
community to be viewed not as a “deconstruction” or a reification, but as the 
expression of one’s subjectivity. If gender can be articulated as a sign, then the 
importance of gender as a site for social analysis can be understood as an effect of 
signification and not because it reflects an essential quality that organizes subjectivity. 
This repositions gender as a process emerging with the subject, moving beyond the 
presumption that gender exists as an ontological entity residing in us all.
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Fortunately, in her article Bolin provides a large number of actual statements 
made by her informants. These statement provide the material to re-interpret the 
practices of the transgender community as being indicative of “something more” than a 
strategic move in the politics of identity. With this said let’s turn to the work of Lacan, 
beginning with an explanation of his elusive statement that describes the end of the 
psychoanalytic process as the moment the analysand “becomes their sinthome”1. 
Explaining this process begins a discussion of Lacan’s understanding of the subject; 
from here the discussion will expand to include the subject’s relationship to reality and 
the implications of Lacan’s thought for Bolin’s analysis of gender.
In order to understand how the end of the psychoanalytic procedure is signaled by 
the moment the patient “identifies with their sinthome,” the complex relationship 
between the symptom, reality, and the subject must be explained since Lacan bestows a 
radically ontological status on the symptom in his work. In order to describe the 
Lacanian symptom I will be relying on the work of Slovoj Zizek, who, when ‘looking 
awry’2 at the body of Lacan’s work, describes the symptom as a “fissure” or an 
“asymmetry” designating a moment in which the subject has stumbled or fallen when
1 The term “sinthome” is used by Lacan to designate a “psychotic kernel that can neither be interpreted (as 
symptom) nor “traversed” as fantasy.’’(Zizek 1991:137) What is important to recognize in his usage of this 
term is that it is neither symptom nor fantasy, but a fundamental illogical foundation upon which all o f 
existence is based. Zizek describes the formulation o f the term as “A neologism containing a set of 
associations (synthetic-artificial man, synthesis between symptom and fantasy, Saint Thomas, the
saint...)(Lacan 1988). Symptom as sinthome is a certain signifying formation penetrated with enjoyment: it is 
a signifier as a bearer of jouis-sense, enjoyment-in-sense ”(Zizekl989:75)
2 ‘Looking Awry’ is the title of one o f Zizek’s books. He uses this phrase several times to describe how it is 
sometimes easier to approach Lacanian theory from anywhere except head on. In this particular work of 
Zizek approaches Lacanian theory through the films of Alfred Hitchcock. I have taken Zizek’s phrase to 
describe a similar process in which I will not be looking directly head-on at Lacan’s work; instead I will 
bring Lacanian thought into light through other people’s explanations o f his work.
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confronted by the “Real”3. Metaphorically speaking this stumble causes a scratch or a 
bruise in the subject’s psychic development. The pain of being psychically scratched is 
so great that it cannot be remembered, resulting in an imperfection in the body of 
knowledge pertaining to the subject’s self. The symptom develops over the scratch 
both to cover over this lack in ones self-knowledge as well as to shield the subject from 
re-experiencing the original traumatic event through its remembrance. As understood 
by Lacan the subject covers over this trauma with a pleasurable thought, making the 
symptom a sight of enjoyment. Lacan speaks of the symptom as a site of enjoyment 
because the initial pain of the wound is replaced by a pleasurable sensation, making 
desire a component of the symptom. We come to desire the symptom for the pleasure 
it provides. In this way the subject desires to return to the originary site of the trauma 
to derive the pleasurable sensation of the symptom. Due to the pleasurable sensation of 
returning to the symptom the symptom persists, providing an organizing principle in 
our existence.
The example Zizek uses to describe the connection between the symptom and 
enjoyment is a slip of the tongue. A slip of the tongue “causes discomfort and 
displeasure when it occurs, but we embrace its interpretation with pleasure; we explain 
gladly to others the meaning of our slips; their ‘intersubjective recognition’ is usually a 
source of intellectual satisfaction ”(Zizekl989:74) Lacan’s formulation of the 
symptom as an ontological entity stems from the pleasurable sensation of its return.
31 have capitalized and placed this term in quotation marks to bring attention to the feet that I am referring 
to Lacan’s notion o f the Real. A term used to describe that which exists beyond the scope o f language to 
describe or approximate. A world from which the subject is irretrievably separated from upon entry into 
language thus establishing subjectivity as a lack, and thus desire as a fundamental condition o f the subject.
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The subject gladly corrects him or herself in the case of slips of the tongue, explaining 
what they actually meant with joy. So when Lacan states that the symptom is 
“penetrated with enjoyment” he is referring to the psychic process of returning to an 
original traumatic moment to confer meaning on that unassimilable moment of pain 
through explanation. The subject returns to the point of trauma in the pleasure of 
interpretation as opposed to re-experiencing the terror of the initial moment.
The symptom, as a slip of the tongue, although causing displeasure at the moment 
it occurs immediately becomes a site of pleasure once it has been explained. The 
explanation invites interpretation, moving us away from a description of the original 
encounter that actually demands explanation. We return to the trauma by way of its 
symptom, its explanation. This covers over the initial trauma of the experience with a 
surplus explanation that invites interpretation. Interpreting the symptom does not delve 
into the true cause of the slip it involves an exploration of the explanation. This 
protects the subject from having to explain the originary cause of the slip, a process that 
involves re-experiencing the unassimilable encounter with the terrifying pleasures of 
the “Real” through remembrance.
To return to the original analogy of the symptom as a contusion, the symptom 
covers over the original traumatic event with a surplus of tissue, concealing the ori ginal 
wound but marking it forever. We can speak of the symptom as an imperfection or scar 
that covers over the initial wound but continually draws attention back to the site of 
that wound. This excess “tissue” of the symptom prevents the subject from ever 
forgetting the originary trauma. The site is marked but not assimilated into the
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subject’s knowledge of its self. The fact that the scar of the symptom bears the trace of 
the originary traumatic event, an event that resists signification, means that the subject 
continually returns to the symptom in the psycho-analytic process. Through 
psychoanalysis the analysand returns to the symptom as opposed to integrating the 
actual trauma into the symbolic. This marks the point around which the subject has 
organized his or her enjoyment. It is the transmutation of the subject’s understanding 
of their symptom from a surplus explanation to an “isolated kernel of their 
enjoyment”(Zizek:1991) that represents the transformation of the symptom into 
sinthome, marking the end of the psychoanalytic process for Lacan. Zizek refers to this 
as follows:
(The real is) that which resists symbolization: the traumatic point which is always missed 
but none the less always returns, although we try, to integrate it into the symbolic order.
In the perspective of the last stages o f Lacanian teaching, it is precisely the symptom 
which is conceived as such a real kernel of enjoyment, which persists as a surplus and 
returns through all attempts to domesticate it, to gentrify it, to dissolve it by means of 
explication, of putting-into-words its meaning.(Zizekl989:69)
The symptom as sinthome has a radically ontological status, providing the only 
point around which subjectivity can be organized. Zizek makes this clear when he 
states: “Symptom, conceived as sinthome, is literally our only substance, the only 
positive support of our being, the only point that gives consistency to the 
subject.”(Zizekl989:75) What is important to recognize is the relationship between the 
symptom and existence. For, as Zizek makes clear, the symptom as that which shields 
and separates us from the “Real” takes on the very character of that “Real” from which 
it shields us. The symptom becomes an unassimilable signifier, a hidden kernel of 
truth upon which we organize enjoyment and hence existence. The symptom, when
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articulated as a site of enjoyment, resists symbolization since its explication would 
entail the breakdown of the symbolic order. Articulating the symptom forces the 
subject to re-experience the terrifying encounter with the real through its articulation. 
To explain the symptom is to explain the single kernel of truth upon which the subject 
has organized their enjoyment, and hence their existence. Such an act would mean 
succession to the death drive and the dissolution of the subject.
Symptom is the way we - the subjects - avoid madness, the way we choose something (the 
symptom-formation) instead of nothing (radical psychotic autism, the destruction of the symbolic 
universe) through the binding of our enjoyment to a certain signifying, symbolic formation which 
assures a minimum of consistency to our being-in-the world.(Zizekl989:75)
The psycho-analytic process comes to an end when the subject “identifies with 
their symptom” because that is the moment the patient recognizes the foundation of 
their being and the fundamental impossibility of understanding their subjectivity 
through its explanation. Identification with the symptom provides the subject with 
knowledge of the point around which all their enjoyment revolves, establishing a 
consistency to their being in the form of complete knowledge of their self but not of 
their subjectivity. “The analysis achieves its end when the patient is able to recognize, 
in the Real of his symptom, the only support of his being. ”(Zizekl989:75). And the 
phrase Lacan uses to describe this point around which the subject organizes their being- 
in-the-world is referred to as the “object petit ‘a’”.
By discussing Lacan’s conception of the “object petit a” we return to gender and 
to the practices of the transgender community because this term describes the form of
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the relationship between the subject and the object cause of its desire4. This translates 
into the articulation of the relationship between the transgender(ist) as a subject, and 
the attainment of his or her desired ends, the social identity of the gender category 
opposite their sex. In other words Lacan’s concept allows us to look at the object that 
is being signified by the transgender community as a sign while keeping in mind the 
inability of the subject to attain that object by means of its signifiers. Through Lacan’s 
articulation of the symptom and of “the object petit a”, we can begin to speak of the 
sartorial and surgical manipulation of the signifiers of gender and sex as the expression 
of a desire - a desire stemming from a lack in the symbolic system. As in the case of 
the symptom this lack is covered over by an excess of signifiers that continually fall 
short of describing and hence attaining the object they describe. Viewing gender as this 
excess of signification covering over a lack calls for a re-reading of Bolin’s argument 
since the object Bolin claims to be represented by the transgender community, a third 
gender, might be more appropriately understood as an effect of signification that takes 
the form of a third gender retro-actively. Such a re-reading looks at cross-dressing as 
being organized by an economy of enjoyment and not a political agenda. Incorporating 
enjoyment into our understanding of cross-dressing enables the persistence of 
masculine and feminine expressions in the transgender community to be explained. 
What is desired by the transgender community is not the deactivation of gender but the 
enjoyment of living as a member of the gender opposite to one’s sex. This repositions
4 “Object cause of desire” is the Lacanian term used to describe the literal object we desire, and not the 
signifier of that object. It is important to note that the attainment o f the object cause o f desire is an 
impossibility for Lacan. Lacan believes we are separated from this object by the symbolic network of 
language. All we can know of this object is our desire for its signifier, which always occupies a relational 
position to other signifiers and has not relationship to the object itself
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the place of the commodity in our understanding of the transgender community, 
locating its meaning as the expression of desire and not in its use-value.
But for now let’s begin with a description of Lacan’s term for die point around 
which one’s being-in-the-world is organized, “the object petit ‘a’“ I will begin with its 
definition as it is described by Jaques-Alain Miller, editor of Lacan’s book The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. According to Miller:
The ‘a’ in question stands for ‘autre’ (other), the concept having been developed out of 
the Freudian ‘object’ and Lacan’s own exploitation o f‘otherness’. The ‘petit a’ (small a) 
differentiates the object from (while relating it to) the ‘Autre’ o f‘Grand Autre’ (the 
capitalized ‘Other’). However, Lacan refiises to comment on either term here, leaving the 
reader to develop an appreciation of the concept in the course of their use. Furthermore,
Lacan insists that ‘object petit a’ should remain untranslated, thus acquiring, as it were, 
the status of an algebraic sign.( Miller in Lacan)
After reading the above statement the impossibility of understanding the ‘a’ 
without understanding Lacan’s conception of the relationship between the subject and 
object is obvious. In Lacanian thought, the relationship between the subject and the 
object is always characterized by a lack due to the inability of any signifying system to 
ever accurately describe reality. This means the signifier can never provide the means 
for attaining the material object it represents. This inherent lack endemic to all 
symbolic systems establishes desire as a component part of the subject. The subject 
upon entry into the symbolic order of language is separated from the objects that cause 
and hence can fulfill its desire. We can understand this lack in the symbolic network as 
bringing the subject into being by establishing desire as the organizing principle around 
which subjecti vity develops. Because of this lack the subject emerges as a desiring 
being - a being that can only experience objects as they are symbolized yet is acted
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upon and influenced by actual material objects. The thing, or object in and of itself 
remains unknown and unattainable with the capacity for conscious thought being an 
effect of entry into the same network of signifiers naming the objects of the material 
world. We are denied access to that which is promised by the sign because we are part 
and parcel of the symbolic system that describes the world in which we live. The 
signifier seems to promise access to the object it describes but this is an impossibility 
because it is part of an over all imperfect system. The signifier always falls short of its 
promise. Desire can never be satiated. We may attain the signifiers of what we desire 
but never the object which would put an end to desire itself.
Zizek describes Lacan’s understanding of the relationship between the subject and 
the object through the myth of the Tortoise and the Hare. In this description the Hare is 
to be understood as representative of language as a symbolic system with the tortoise 
representing the material objects of the real world. The Hare, although much faster 
than the Tortoise, can never attain the Tortoise. The Hare may overtake the Tortoise, 
leaving him behind but he can never succeed in catching him. If the Hare were to catch 
the Tortoise desire would be fulfilled and the game would end. Instead the Hare and 
the Tortoise are locked in a scheme in which the Hare is always “too fast or too slow” 
and thereby prevented from attaining the Tortoise, which would end the game. “The 
paradox stages the relation of the subject to the object-cause [the material thing 
existing in the world] of its desire, which can never be attained. The object-cause is 
always missed; all we can do is encircle it.”(Zizekl992:4) What happens is a 
displacement. We displace our desire for the object-cause onto the symbol or name for
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the object-cause of desire. The symbol, or name, for our desire stands in for the actual 
object-cause thus becoming “the object petit a”.
As a result of desire “the object petit a” is always a surplus. It is continually 
asked to fill a hole, or that which is lacking, in the symbolic network. It is this over- 
determined quality of “the object petit a” that explains Lacan’s desire to leave the 
phrase untranslated. For in leaving “the object petit a” untranslated the phrase retains 
the form of an algebraic symbol. Untranslated ‘the object petit a’ illustrates the 
meaninglessness of the phrase itself. So just as ‘the object petit a’ is always standing in 
as a replacement for the actual object-cause of desire, the phrase, in its untranslated 
form, has no meaning absent of the referent to which it is linked in description. Only 
by remaining untranslated is the unique relationship between the subject, desire, and 
desire’s object-cause retained as it is described. So when Zizek describes ‘a’ as, “An 
empty form filled out by everyone’s fantasy.”(Zizekl991:134), “the object petit a” can 
be understood as the sign that stands in for that which cannot be signified.
It is the capacity of Lacanian thought and of his notion of the ‘a’ that poses 
interesting questions to Bolin and her conception of gender. “The object a” as both a 
psychological formation and an algebraic sign describes what we are looking at when 
we see gender in the symbolic constructions of the transgender community. In other 
words, gender does not exist prior to its construction in the symbolic statements made 
by subjects. The primacy of gender as a site of cultural organization must be 
understood as an effect of the symbolic system in which subjects express themselves 
and not as the result of an ideology with historical origins. The dangers of confusing
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the effects of signification with universalist assumptions is illustrated by Joan Copjec 
who states”
It is important not to confuse the object ‘a’ with some poetical or essentialist notion of the 
subject. This object does not proceed the statement but is instead its retroactive effect, 
the surplus that overruns what is said and that ‘always comes back to the same place’, 
always designates the same thing - again, retroactively - no matter how self contradictory 
the statements that produce it.(Copjec: 143)
Bolin has confused the contradictory nature of the statements made by the 
transgender(ists) as expressing the poetical notion liberation. Yes, the transgender 
community does juxtapose the signifiers of one gender with those of the opposite sex 
but this does not equal expressing a new, liberated identity. Instead this act expresses 
the same gender categories over and over again. In Bolin’s case the object, gender, is 
assumed to be an essential characteristic of the subject when in fact the assemblage of 
signifiers representing gender need to be understood as a surplus covering over a lack 
in the symbolic system. In this way we can understand gender as ‘the object petit a’ 
since it “names the void of that unattainable surplus”(Zizekl991:134) By 
understanding gender as an ‘object petit a’, as an embelished object standing in for that 
which canot be signified, we can articulate the practices of the transgender community 
as an ‘identification with their sinthome’. Such an understanding describes how the 
transgender community has organized their being around an essential kernel of 
enjoyment, illustrating the illusory nature of subjectivity and how Lacan’s formulation
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of the subject operates to reposition the commodity in studies, such as Bolin’s, dealing 
with identity.
In order to understand how the transgender community’s practices can be 
understood as an ‘identification with their sinthome’ we need to turn to the statements 
in Bolin’s text in which the subjects actually describe their own identity. What 
becomes apparent is an awareness on the part of the transgender community of the 
impossibility of the signifiers of gender to express their subjectivity. The most telling 
example of this is seen in the words of Joan, a thirty nine year old biological male, who 
describes him/herself as follows.
I’m a transsexual. I’m different from many in that I do not, at this time at least, feel a 
need to fede into society and hide my past. Rather I have come out to all around me, 
family, friends and co-workers . ..I’m not yet living as a woman full time, but I am just 
starting a part-time job where I’ll be doing a job as Joan. On my regular job (three days a 
week), I’m still Jerry. I don’t really believe that I’m a “woman trapped in a man’s body.”
I’m not sure what I am, only that making this transition is more important to me than 
anything else in my life.(Bolinl 994:464)
For Bolin this statement illustrates the increased flexibility of the newly emerging 
gender paradigm. It solidifies her claim that it is now possible for a biological male to 
exist as a third gender, removing the need to surgically transform one’s body to live 
socially as a female. From the Lacanian perspective, one that calls into question the 
capacity of the subject to attain the desired object, what becomes immediately apparent 
is the recognition on Joan’s part of the lack inherent to the signifying system. Joan is 
perfectly well aware of the fact that what she/he is cannot be described. In light of this 
the importance of Joan’s statement shifts from her expression of the wish to live 
socially as a female to the fact that Joan doesn’t know what she is while continuing to
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desire being identified as feminine. For Joan the signifiers of gender are more 
important than the object. Joan is not interested in attaining the object femininity 
promised by the arrangement of signifiers she has assembled. She knows assembling 
the signifiers of femininity does not equal becoming a different gender. Instead 
femininity has become an embellished object of desire for Joan.
In Joan’s uncertainty we can see the awareness that even though he/she may attain 
the sign of the desired object, i.e. living as a woman socially, Joan is well aware that 
the sign is not the actual thing he/she desires. And living as the sign of that object is 
not the same as being that object. Yet it is also important to recognize the continued 
longing for the object-cause of Joan’s desire. This continued longing for the object- 
cause of desire depicted by Joan’s drive to make the transition from living as a male to 
living as a female shows Joan’s love for the surplus of embellished signifiers covering 
the hole in the signifying system. What Joan has articulated is the classic conception of 
‘the object petit a’, a love for and fascination with the material signifiers of that which 
cannot be signified.
The fact that “this transition [from male to female] is more important to [Joan] 
than anything else in life” signals the moment in which Joan has “become her 
symptom”. Even in light of the known impossibility of attaining the object-cause of 
desire, the feminine gender6, Joan’s desire for the signifiers bearing the trace of this 
unattainable “Real” persists. Joan has organized her being-in-the-worid around the 
surplus of signifiers representing femininity even in light of the known impossibility of
6 An interesting side note is that it doesn’t have to be understood as the feminine gender that Joan is 
desiring. It can be understood as simply “gender” that is desired and femininity is the form this desire has 
taken due to its position in the symbolic network as an impossibility.
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attaining their promise. Joan has replaced the desire for the “Real” promised by the 
signs with the reality of the signifier. To explain away this desire through its 
assimilation into the symbolic would be to dissolve the kernel of enjoyment around 
which Joan has organized her existence. Cross-dressing, at least for Joan, is an act 
penetrated with enjoyment, and cannot be viewed as stemming from the political 
agendas of an agential subject.
A Lacanian understanding of cross-dressing repositions the role of the commodity 
form in the practice of cross-dressing. It is removed from its central location as a 
catalyst enabling the emergence of new identities and placed within a grammatical 
structure organized by desire. From the Lacanian perspective gender becomes a 
property of the commodity form as opposed to an object represented by the commodity. 
The commodity form, whose qualities are established by its relationship to other 
signifiers, defines the object gender by encircling a lack in the symbolic system. This 
excess of signification established by this lack becomes the object gender with the 
promise of an actual quality upon which to organize subjectivity becoming a 
phantasmic quality of the commodity form and its location in a symbolic sequence.
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Chapter Five: 
Whose Crisis is Being Represented?
“Twentieth-century social and cultural anthropology has promised its still largely Western 
readership enlightenment on two fronts. The one has been the salvaging of distinct 
cultural forms of life from a process o f apparent global Westernization....The other 
promise o f anthropology, one less fully distinguished and attended to than the first, has 
been to serve as a form of cultural critique for ourselves. In using portraits of other 
cultural patterns to reflect self-critically on our own ways, anthropology disrupts common 
sense and makes us reexamine our taken-for-granted assumptions.”(Marcusl986:1)
In the above passage George Marcus describes the reason anthropology is done. 
Marcus’s statement begins his book, Anthropology as Cultural Critique, a work 
exploring the contemporary debate surrounding the epistemological problems 
associated with representing different social organizations in writing. For Marcus this 
debate hinges on a crisis of representation stemming from developments in the fields of 
philosophy and literary criticism which call into question the capability to accurately 
describe social reality. Questions of this sort strike deep at the heart of anthropology 
since ethnography is based on the assumption that different social realities can be 
described in writing. It is assumed ethnographic descriptions are factual 
representations, and if not a close facsimile to the social reality in which the 
anthropologist conducted his or her field-work
The crisis stems from questions pertaining to the possibility of attaining an 
objective position from which to view social reality. The empiricism formerly relied 
upon by the social sciences for the positivistic study of society has been shown to be an
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impossibility, reflecting more the desires of the researcher and the concerns of the field 
than the dynamics of the actual encounter. The portrayal of empiricism in written 
accounts of field work is now viewed as politically suspect due to the altered image of 
the encounter necessitated by its portrayal in objective terms. The conventions of the 
field demanding empirical descriptions are now considered to objectify those whose 
lives are represented by the text. This crisis has been understood as one of 
representation since what is at question is the capacity of symbolic systems such as 
language or film to produce accurate images of the subjects they seek to depict. These 
mediums are now known to depend on culturally specific symbolic systems for the 
production of meaning and are not seen as value neutral forms of communication. 
Elevating questions of description to the level of theoretical reflection brings to the 
center of discussion the effect discursive practices have on determining the image 
produced. We now see the stylistic formalities of ethnography and the structure of 
language as determining the image of the subject described.
In the effort to address these questions of representation anthropologists have 
incorporated literary theory and interpretive philosophy into their understanding and 
analysis of the social world. The incorporation of these two fields has had a profound 
impact on the practice of writing ethnography, drastically changing both the form and 
content of the genre. For the most part ethnography is no longer considered to be 
guided by empiricism. Empiricism in ethnography is now recognized as being a 
stylistic formality demanded by the writing practices of the field and as a tool for 
establishing the authority of the author rather than a methodology that ensures the
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accuracy of field accounts. Contemporary ethnography is now directed by the writing 
styles of the humanities and by the concerns of interpretive philosophy rather than the 
empiricism of its heritage. This trend can be seen in the work of Bolin and Hebdige, 
whose ethnographic accounts engage literary theory and hermeneutic philosophy in 
their portrayals of subjectivity. Both author’s work can be described as experimental 
since their incorporation of hermeneutics is guided by the effort to overcome the crisis 
of representation by developing approaches to ethnography that circumvent the 
problems associated with representing social reality. And in keeping with the tradition 
of anthropology, these authors have produced studies that are critical of contemporary 
societal practices. These texts can be read as responses to the political concerns of 
representation, with the separate texts serving as examples in which different 
techniques of interpretation and presentation have been used to avoid objectifying the 
subjects represented in ethnography. It is the intent of this chapter to show how these 
texts falter, coming up short of their goal and to describe a possible alternative offered 
by Lacanian psycho-analytic theory.
The spirit of experimentation guiding these studies can be seen in the vocabulary 
and structure of Bolin’s argument. Bolin describes the practices of the transgender 
community as “deconstructing” the dominant gender paradigm, invoking the 
vocabulary and reading techniques of contemporary literary theory. The use of 
deconstruction as a framework guiding ethnographic studies is indicative of new 
approaches in field work because it represents a reconfiguration of the relationship 
between the anthropologist and the subject of study. Bolin approaches her subjects as
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one approaches a text. She assumes the actions of the transgender community are 
ordered and structured like a language. These actions and practices are assumed to be 
symbolic of larger cultural logics that organize everyday life just as grammar orders 
speech utterances. Due to this arrangement Bolin is able to read the practices of the 
transgender community as one reads a text. And in this case Bolin considers her 
reading to illuminate how the practices of the transgender community “deconstruct” the 
ideological system constructing our gender categories. Articulating the transgender 
community’s practices as a text which “deconstructs” gender defines Bolin’s position 
in relation to her subjects. In positioning herself as a reader she is locating herself as a 
detached observer separated from the lives of those she studies.
In order to understand how Bolin’s position as a “reader” of the transgender 
community’s text defines her relationship to the subjects of her study we need to return 
to the example she provides of her affinities to the transgender community as an 
anthropologist. In the following example it can be seen how her identity as an 
anthropologist is situated in relation to the subjects in her study.
At both the transgender community conferences I attended, symposia were organized that 
included historical and cross-cultural aspects o f cross-dressing. At the National 
Transgender Annual Meetings, I was invited as an anthropologist to present cross-cultural 
evidence o f cross-dressing. Members of the audience were most interested in two topics: 
the kinds of data that identified the Berdache as a high-status position and the question of 
how Berdache are conceptualized as a third or alternative gender mitigating against 
clinical typologies.(Bolinl994:476)
In this statement we see Bolin identifying herself as a subject, with the “I” 
representing the anthropologist invited to conventions as an authority on gender and 
cross cultural evidence of cross-dressing. Bolin assumes the evidence she presents is
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being used by the transgender community as the raw material for the construction of 
identity. As was shown earlier, this assumption pertaining to the use-value of 
anthropological knowledge depicts the transgender(ist) as an agential subject. What 
was not previously addressed is the effect of this assumption for Bolin’s own 
subjectivity. Bolin, as the producer of the knowledge consumed by the transgender 
community, is also assumed to be an agential subject. It is assumed that she as the 
producer of this knowledge is an authority whose status enables her to see the truth 
about the transgender community’s practices. Bolin’s role as a producer of knowledge 
makes her transcendent. Bolin, as a subject, remains a unified being who enters into 
her own text as an authority, as one whose position is never risked by its encounter with 
an “other”. The‘T ’ who speaks at transgender conventions is a stable entity whose 
gaze defines the subjects of her study by bringing them into view as a third gender 
category. The problem with this arrangement, one directly attributable to the 
theoretical position from which she speaks, is its production of self identical subjects. 
This is seen in both her assumption that the‘T ’ through which she enters her own text 
represents her as a subject, just as the “you” that she is writing about identifies with the 
image of the transgender community she presents in her text. For Bolin, both she and 
the transgendered subject are self identical with their representation in her text, 
establishing a uniformity between subjects where none might exist.
The problems with producing a text in which the subjects are assumed to 
recognize themselves in their own image is similar to the problem found with 
Hebdige’s text, one in which he described the subject’s mis-recognition of their image
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as a failure on the part of his text. But as was discussed earlier, the problem with his 
text is not that the subjects fail to recognize themselves in their own image, but in the 
reason he posits for this phenomenon. He attributes the failure of his text to produce a 
self same image of the punks as the work of ideology. According to Hebdige, ideology 
operates to veil the true social relationships being expressed in the practices of 
subculture. In a sense Hebdige believes subjects are duped into believing they are not 
the carrier of the truth he claims they are. But, an alternative interpretation of this 
phenomenon is to attribute this fai lure of recognition to a fundamental characteristic of 
the subject, the capacity to continually deny the validity of their image as it is produced 
by a gaze. Both the production of self-identical subjects and subjects that deny the 
validity of their own image due to ideology, "trap” the subject in representation. 
Trapping the subject in representation denies the subject the capacity to question its 
own image. The result is the mis-representation of the subject through the ascription of 
a positive function to the gaze. The gaze of Hebdige and the gaze of Bolin are assumed 
to function positively, to bring the subject into being. Literally the gaze is assumed to 
make the subject visible. Such an assertion results in the conflation of effect and 
realization, with ideology being recognized as that which produces reality as opposed 
to falsifying it in a veil of representation.(Copjecl994) This posits the authority to 
define the subjectivity of the other in the gaze of the author who describes that other. 
The alternative is to embrace the psychoanalytic conception of the subject as an entity 
that continually evades representation and thereby questions the authority of the 
author’s gaze.
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As articulated in psycho-analysis the subject is understood as never being present 
in its representation. Representation is always viewed as an effect, as a secondary 
process of subjectivity mediated by language. The subject itself cannot be found in its 
articulation. The experience of the subject is condensed and disfigured as it is 
translated into language due to the inability of signifying systems such as language to 
accurately represent reality. This shifts the search for the subject from the contents of 
its articulations to the form taken by these articulations. In psycho-analysis the 
emphasis is placed on the form of subjectivity as it is brought into being by a speaking 
subject. This makes all representations of subjectivity questionable, and the authority 
of an author who describes the subject dubious at best since not even the subject is an 
authority on its own representation. Calling into question all representations of 
subjectivity gives the subject the freedom to question its own image as it is represented 
by another subject. Zizek refers to this phenomenon as the capacity of the subject to 
always pose a question to its own image. Allowing the subject this capacity in 
representation avoids trapping the subject in the gaze of the author. According to Zizek 
the subject continually asks, “che vuoi? (who me?)” when confronted by its own image, 
questioning the authority of the gaze in whose light it is being represented. We can see 
this process taking place in Hebdige’s work when he describes the shortcoming of his 
text. Hebdige states:
It is highly unlikely that the members of any of the subcultures described in this book 
would recognize themselves reflected here. They are still less likely to welcome any 
efforts on our part to understand them....We should hardly be surprised to find our 
‘sympathetic’ readings of subordinate culture are regarded by the members of a subculture 
with just as much indifference and contempt as the hostile labels imposed by the courts 
and the press. In this respect, to get the point is to miss the point.(Hebdigel 979:139)
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According to Hebdige the fact that his text is likely to be viewed with derision 
and scorn signals his text’s failure to bridge the gap between language, experience, and 
reality since the subjects do not recognize themselves in their image as it has been 
portrayed in the text. In Hebdige’s work this failure of recognition operates as 
evidence for the truth of Hebdige’s reading of subculture. According to Hebdige his 
theoretical apparatus has produced such an exact representation of the subject of 
subculture that he or she cannot recognize themselves. Ideology prevents such 
recognition. The subjects of subculture are trapped by ideology. But Hebdige as a 
transcendent subject is not. He can see through ideology and into the true meaning of 
subculture. He “gets the point”, he knows what subculture means, but this meaning 
cannot be assimilated into subculture because to do so would be to dissolve it. 
Subculture must deny that Hebdige has caught its image. As was shown earlier in this 
reading of subculture the authority to determine the meaning of subculture resides 
squarely in the gaze of Hebdige.
The psycho-analytic interpretation of the subjects failure to recognize themselves 
in the text removes Hebdige from the position of authority and also questions the 
capacity of the subject to be an authority on its own representation. The psycho­
analytic reading does not claim that subculture is blind to the true meaning of its acts, 
as Hebdige claims, but acknowledges the capacity of the subject to see its image in the 
text - an image that reflects the perspective of a gaze. Psycho-analysis then takes into 
consideration the subject’s capacity to deny the authority of that gaze, giving the 
subject the autonomy to formulate itsself absent of the terms mandated by an “other’s”
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gaze. This is different from saying members of subculture are fully aware of the 
meaning of their actions. It simply gives the subject the freedom to evade its 
entrapment in the gaze of an “other”.
From the psycho-analytic perspective it is obvious that the image of subculture 
painted in Hebdige’s text would be viewed with derision. It operates in the same 
fashion as the labels from the courts and the press do, as an imposition that continually 
subordinates subculture to the authority of an outside gaze. The fact that this image is 
held in contempt comes from the subject escaping the authority of that gaze. If the 
subject had not escaped these images would not be held in contempt or derision but in 
the love of narcissism. The images and labels provided by Hebdige’s text would 
illustrate that the subject of subculture had achieved its desired ends, the construction 
of difference. And the contempt of society would be justified since that would be the 
intention of their actions. To come to this conclusion would be to take the message of 
subculture at face value and would assume that subjects operate with complete 
knowledge of their actions. Recognizing the subject’s capacity to question their 
appearance in another’s gaze exposes desire and the operation of the gaze by 
illustrating how representation comes from a demand being placed on the subject. 
Incorporating the capacity of the subject to ask “che vuoi” into our understanding of the 
subject reconfigures our understanding of textual representations by revealing the effect 
of desire in description. When such studies as those of Hebdige and Bolin are shown 
to be infused with desire the image painted of the subject takes the form of a demand. 
The punks see their image in Hebdige’s text, they look at it and ask “che vuoi?” [Who
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Me?], then respond with: ‘You’re telling me that, but what do you want with it, what 
are you aimingat?”(Zizekl9989:111) By exposing the desire behind this 
representation, this question denies the authority of Hebdige’s gaze to represent them in 
any light.
For Lacan this demand posed to the subject by an author locates desire, 
illuminating how the author demands something from the subject which the subject 
cannot provide. The question “che vuoi” asks the author, “what do you really want, 
what are you aiming at through this demand?”(Zizekl989:l 11) So when Hebdige or 
Bolin produce texts in which the subjects either recognize themselves, as in the case of 
Bolin, or fail to recognize themselves, as with Hebdige, we need to ask questions 
concerning the desire of the author. By asking why they presented the subjects of their 
study in such a fashion we can understand where we might find the subject being 
represented in the text. Finding where the subject resides in these representations 
enables questions to be explored concerning the political implications of 
representation. And just as Hebdige’s mis-representation of subculture has been argued 
to be problematic we need to view Bolin’s presentation of self-same subjects as equally 
questionable. It will be shown that building an argument around the assumption that 
the image produced by your text will be self identical to the subject traps the subject in 
the same way as the claim that ideology prevents the subject from recognizing 
themselves in the image of the text. Both deny the subject the capacity to ask che 
vuoi?, and thereby miss the subject whose representation is sought. As was seen with 
Hebdige, the demand that subjects be self same also locates the author’s desire with the
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production of self same images equaling a demand to present the subject in a certain 
light. And in Bolin’s case, the light in which she presents her subjects is one in which 
she remains a stable fixture, an “I” that is unchallenged and unified.
How does Bolin’s production of self identical subjects expose desire and in so 
doing the failure of the text to accurately portray subjectivity? Returning to the work of 
Joan Copjec and her analysis of the “Orthopsychic Subject” provides the answer. As 
will be seen what is at stake is more than the portrayal of subjectivity, but the position 
of the author in ethnographic accounts. In order to show how the position of the author 
is at stake in representations of subjectivity we need to refer again to Lacan’s diagram 
of the two interpenetrating triangles. This diagram describes the relationship between 
‘the gaze’ and ‘the subject of representation’, illustrating how Lacan’s understanding of 
the gaze takes into account both the perspective of the author who does the 
representing as well as the subject that is being represented.
The Subject 
of RepresentationThe G aze
(Figure 2. Diagram o f the Lacanian gaze)
As the diagram illustrates, for Lacan, both positions are equally constructed by the gaze 
emanating from the other. And, as we can see in the diagram Bolin has failed to take
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into account the effect of her gaze in constructing both the subjects she is representing 
as well as the “I” representing herself, two positions constructed by the gaze of an 
always present third position.7 The failure to consider her position as an “I” in 
language as being a position constructed by the same gaze that illuminates the 
transgender community as constructed subjects, perpetuates the image of the 
anthropologist as a unified “Renaissance subject”. It assumes the anthropologist 
possesses transcendent capabilities that allow alterity to be described as a construction 
while denying the constructed nature of their own position. The Lacanian alternative 
emphasizes the primacy of the gaze as a determinant in the subjectivity of both the 
being who identifies with the “I” of language and those who are described by that‘T ’. 
Perhaps the phrase which describes Bolin’s mistake most accurately, and one which 
illustrates the primacy of the gaze in Lacan’s thought is: “The gaze is that which 
‘determines’ the I in the visible; it is ‘the instrument through which...[the] I [is] photo- 
graphed .’’(Copjec 1994:31)
From the Lacanian perspective th e ‘T ’ of language with which Bolin identifies 
needs to be viewed as a construction of an outside gaze. For Lacan, the “I” of language 
with which Bolin is identifying herself is the representation of a constructed position 
whose qualities Bolin has co-opted as her own, making the transcendent position she 
assumes as a producer of knowledge a quality of her subjectivity. The “Renaissance 
perspective” of this “F’ does not exist in the subject who identifies with it. Rather, the 
“Renaissance perspective” claimed by Bolin is a promise of the signifying system, an
7 The third position constructing both of these positions would be represented in the diagram by the eye of
the reader who is viewing the diagram. Lacan refers to this eye as the eye o f the “grand Other”.
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effect of signification due to the position of the signifier, “F \ in language. In Bolin’s 
case she has taken over the attributes of the “I”, assuming that she, Ann Bolin the 
subject, is self identical to the “I” of language. This conflation between th e“F  
representing the gaze and the subject, ‘AnnBolin’, denies a fundamental characteristic 
of signification, the impossibility of accurately signifying the subject. When Bolin 
assumes the position of the “I” representative of the speaking subject in language, she 
presumes that “I” to be a self identical image of herself as a speaking subject. She is 
locating herself at the point of the gaze. And as Copjec points out, “The subject, in 
short, cannot be located or locate itself at the point of the gaze, since this point marks, 
on the contrary, its very annihilation. ”(Copjecl994:35) To occupy the point of the gaze 
is to occupy the position of the hysteric, with the subject assuming the mandated 
position of language as their own as opposed to a position necessarily occupied for 
communication. The subject cannot be located at the point of the gaze because it is an 
unoccupiable point, one that figures as an unrealizable ideal of a subject that is not split 
upon entry into language. To occupy the point of the gaze denies the primacy of the 
system of signification and assumes that there is something behind the field of 
signifiers that can be obtained or captured by that field of signifiers. Lacan refers to 
Bolin’s position as “being trapped in the imaginary” and is representative of her failure 
to recognize the deceptive quality of the subject who continually asks ‘che vuoi?’.
Lacan understands Bolin’s position as hysterical because by identifying with the 
“I” of language, the “F  of the gaze, Bolin is occupying an imaginary point, the point to 
which the transgendered subject addresses their ‘che vuoi’ question. Occupying this
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point represents a split between demand and desire. When Bolin speaks as an authority 
on gender and its construction cross-culturally she in turn is being interrogated by the 
subjects to whom she is turning for knowledge. By occupying this point, and 
representing herself as that point in her text, Bolin’s demand for knowledge is split 
from her desire: an unknown variable illuminated by the transgendered subject’s 
question ‘che vuoi?’ question. In other words, Bolin is telling the transgender 
community something about themselves and in turn is being confronted by a question 
that returns from the audience, a question that asks, “You’re telling me this, but what 
do you want with it, what are you aiming at?”(Zizekl989:111) This question reveals 
Bolin’s desire, an unknown variable prior to the emergence of “che vuoi” question, 
illuminating how her demand for knowledge placed to the transgendered subject is 
misdirected. Bolin is actually asking that her demand be refuted because her demand 
for knowledge is not what she actually wants. Bolin wants her desire fulfilled and not 
knowledge from the subjects of her study. This is the position of the hysteric because 
Bolin is demanding one thing but wanting another. She believes her desire can be 
fulfilled by demanding knowledge from the transgender community while in fact no 
amount of knowledge will ever fulfill her desire. She is misplacing her desire to be a 
unified being onto the knowledge of gender the transgender community appears to be 
able to supply.
From the Lacanian perspective Bolin’s identification with the “I” of language 
represents an identification with “the master”, or “the name of the father”, since 
identification with the “F’ of language represents becoming the subject mandated by
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the gaze. Identifying with this point gives Bolin a “symbolic mandate” to interrogate 
the transgender community. Zizek describes this situation as follows:
The subject is always fastened, pinned to a signifier which represents him [sic] for the 
other, and through this pinning he [sic] is loaded with a symbolic mandate, he is given a 
place in the intersubjective network of symbolic relations.”(Zizekl989:l 13)
In Bolin’s case the signifier to which she has pinned herself as a subject is the 
authoritative “I” representative o f a “Renaissance” perspective in language. The place 
in the symbolic network to which this association fastens Bolin is the position of the 
master or teacher - a master or teacher who views the transgendered subject from the 
imaginary point of the gaze. The problem with constructing an ethnographic account 
from this position is that it serves to reify the authority of the gaze while appearing to 
deconstruct the position of the other. Bolin’s incorporation of literary theory and 
interpretive philosophy into her ethnographic portrayal results in the establishment of a 
new Master - a master who retains the authority of the “I” over that of the other.
The alternative, posed by Lacan, is to recognize the radically textual quality of 
being, to embrace the idea that being is to be a being-of-language. Embracing the 
Lacanian claim leads to the dissolution of the hysteria associated with building an 
ethnography around the point of the gaze by incorporating the impossibility of 
identifying with th e ‘T ’ of language into representation. Recognizing that the subject 
cannot fulfill the symbolic mandate is to recognize that there is nothing beyond the 
signifying network. Once this is achieved, the assumption that there exists an ‘object in 
subject’ such as gender that resists interpretation is done away with. This alternative 
position is described by Copjec when she states:
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Lacan argues that beyond the signifying network, beyond the visual field, there is, in fact, 
nothing at all. The veil of representation actually conceals nothing; there is nothing behind 
representation. Yet the feet that representation seems to hide, to put an arbored screen of 
signifiers in front of something hidden beneath, is not treated by a simple error the subject 
can undo; nor is this deceptiveness of language treated as something that undoes the 
subject, deconstructs its entity by menacing its boundaries. Rather, language’s opacity is 
taken as the very cause of the subject’s being, that is, its desire, or want-to- 
be.(Copjecl994:35)
We can now answer the question as to why Bolin desired to represent the subjects of 
her study as she did. She represented the transgendered subject as agential because she 
desires to be a unified entity that is not cut off from “The Real” by language.
If the occupation of the position of the hysteric produces ethnography that 
searches for and finds a new authority in the “I” of the “Master” or “Grand Other”, 
what about Hebdige? Hebdige’s text, in spite of its short-comings, actually ends by 
producing a convincing portrayal of subculture, providing a potential avenue for future 
representations of alterity. The irony is that where Lacan would find strength in 
Hebdige’s approach, Hebdige himself finds weakness. In order to understand how 
Hebdige’s work illuminates a potential direction for future ethnographic research we 
need to go back and investigate the faults Hebdige finds in his text, because herein lies 
the Lacanian answer to the crisis of representation.
According to Hebdige, his text is a failure because it cannot bridge the gap 
between “language, experience, and reality”(Hebdigel979:10) This is the root of his 
text’s shortcomings, ending in his need to apologize both to his reader as well as to the 
objects of his study. But what is in this gap? Is it really about, as Hebdige claims, the 
hope that the seam between reality and experience could be located and pried open 
through a semiotic analysis? That the “gulf between the alienated intellectual and the
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‘real’ world could be rendered meaningful and miraculously, at the same time, be made 
to disappear. ”(Hebdigel979:10)? Or is this the expression of a desire? A desire which 
cannot possibly be fulfilled due to the situatedness of the subject as a “being in 
language”? In order to answer these questions we need to return to Hebdige’s text, re­
reading his work while keeping in mind the effect of desire in determining the image of 
subculture painted by Hebdige. This involves a discussion of methodology, since it is 
the method employed by Hebdige that contains the seeds of promise for circumventing 
the crisis of representation.
As it turns out Hebdige’s text is less about subculture than it is about developing 
an approach to studying culture. Hebdige’s study of subculture is a study that explores 
the strengths and weaknesses of viewing and interpreting culture in the terms 
established by literary theory. In his text, Hebdige develops an understanding of 
subculture based upon what is known about reading texts. As with Bolin, Hebdige 
reads cultural practices as the symbolic representation of underlying social relations as 
they are expressed in everyday events. Only, unlike Bolin, Hebdige focuses strictly on 
the stylistic expressions of his subjects. Hebdige looks for the truth pertaining to the 
social relationships of capitalism as they are expressed in the stylistic ensembles of 
subculture. He is not looking for something that exists inside his subjects but 
something expressed by the form of their stylistic displays. Where Bolin saw the 
stylistic ensembles of the transgender community expressing an essential quality of 
being, Hebdige sees the expression of specific historical social relationships. Hebdige 
never attempts to dive beneath the surface expressions of style. For Hebdige semiotics
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provides the framework guiding this encounter by providing a view of social relations 
as a symbolic system. Through semiotics social relations can be viewed as a structured 
representation of the whole culture. The intent of this project is two fold. One, it 
hopes to develop a moral philosophy in which the practices of daily life are 
problematized and shown to be part of larger exercises of power on the part of society’s 
dominant. And second: it hopes to isolate mechanisms of domination, illuminating the 
internal relationships between domination and the practices of everyday life for the 
purpose of facilitating change. The intent is to re-position our understanding of 
societal practices in order to incite social change.
This approach, as with Bolin’s, insists culture is a text organized and structured 
like a language. The network of symbols representing social relations are ordered by a 
grammatical structure whose form contains a message separate from but integral to its 
content. This means social processes can be understood in die same fashion as a 
literary work. One can read to develop an understanding of society’s intricacies and 
interconnections just as one reads to understands a literary work. Only, whereas Bolin 
incorporates Derridean philosophy, whether accurately or inaccurately, imbuing 
cultural formations with deconstructive capacities, Hebdige remains committed to a 
conception of the real that allows for a moral philosophy of society. This distinction 
can be seen in the employment of Marxist semiotics and in its application to the 
analysis of class through the surface expressions of subculture in Hebdige’s study. 
Hebdige makes this clear when he states:
Barthes’ notion of culture extends beyond the library, the opera-house and the theater to 
encompass the whole of everyday life. But this everyday life is for Barthes overlaid with a 
significance which is at once more insidious and more systematically organized. Starting 
from the premise that ‘myth is a type of speech’, Barthes set out in Mythologies to
94
examine the normally hidden set of rules, codes and conventions through which meanings 
particular to specific social groups (i.e. those in power) are rendered universal and ‘given’ 
for the whole of society.(Hebdigel979:9)
The strength of this “Cultural Studies” project is the emphasis placed on form as 
opposed to content. The surface signifiers of social interactions are read to reveal the 
symbolic logic’s ordering societal practices. Interestingly, while Hebdige champions 
studying the formal properties of culture as opposed to the analysis of culture’s 
contents, he is left empty by it. He is left disappointed and desiring the unification of 
language, experience, and reality. This disappointment felt by Hebdige provides the 
key to analyzing desire in Hebdige’s text since it illuminates the moment Hebdige’s 
desire is not fulfilled. We can see Hebdige’s lack of fulfillment in his apology to the 
academic community and to the objects of his study for producing a text that fails to 
bridge the gap between reality and experience. It may seem that returning to 
Hebdige’s apology is redundant and that this ground has already been covered, but I am 
returning from a different theoretical perspective. This new perspective sheds a 
different light on the ground already traveled. We can see this in Hebdige’s statement 
that reads:
The study of subcultural style which seemed at the outset to draw us back towards the real 
world, to reunite us with ‘the people’, ends by merely confirming the distance between the 
reader and the ‘text’, between everyday life and the ‘mythologist’ whom it surrounds, 
fascinates and finally excludes. It would seem that we are still, like Barthes, ‘condemned 
for some time yet to speak excessively about reality’.(Hebdigel979:140)
Hebdige views the failure of his text as hinging upon the necessity of prying open the 
“invisible seam between language, experience and reality”(Hebdigel979:10). For 
Hebdige anything less than making this “gulf’ disappear by “rendering it meaningful”
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constitutes a failure. The question that immediately springs to mind is: what 
constitutes a successful text for Hebdige? What conditions need to be met for Hebdige 
to be “happy” with his text? In short the development of a theoretical position that 
unifies language, experience and reality. The development of such a theoretical 
position in Lacanian terms would constitute locating the author at the point of the gaze. 
Only by occupying the originary point of the gaze would the theoretical apparatus 
situating the intellectual “in camera” to the text dissolve, creating a bridge over the gap 
between language and reality. Once this gap has been bridged the intellectual, as 
reader of social texts, can be situated in the text itself, rendering the images produced 
through reflection self identical to the real world of experience. This is the same desire 
as Bolin’s, and as was described before, represents the split desire of the hysteric.
We can understand Hebdige as occupying the position of the hysteric, just as 
Bolin does, by tracing his desire to identify with the ‘T ’ of the symbolic network; or in 
strict Lacanian terms, the “I” of the gaze of the Other. Hebdige is demanding from the 
subject of subculture the fulfillment of his desire for unification with ‘the people’. Yet, 
when confronted with the ‘che vuoi’ question from the subject - illustrated by the 
deference of the subcultural subject to their image as it is presented back in the text - 
Hebdige is shown to desire something else. Hebdige is shown to desire identification 
with the point of the gaze that views both subculture and the intellectual. Hebdige 
seeks a union with the “I” of the symbolic network separating him as a subject from the 
real social relationships hidden behind the signifier. Such a union would result in the 
attainment of the “Renaissance” perspective promised by the symbolic network of
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language, resulting in the attainment of the position of a punctiform being. This 
condition represents a split between desire and demand because Hebdige is demanding 
unification with ‘the people’ but desiring unification with the “F  of language. And as 
was shown earlier in the discussion of Bolin, unification with this point would amount 
to the dissolution of the subject since to become that transcendent being would end 
desire.
Hebdige views his failure in terms of a short-coming on the part of semiotics as a 
theoretical matrix to pry open the ‘invisible seam’ separating reality from experience. 
Hebdige’s sense of failure can be understood as a mistaken conceptualization of the 
gaze. Hebdige is mistakenly looking for confirmation of his existence in the gaze of 
the Other, asking that gaze to render his position as a subject meaningful. As a 
consequence the gaze is ascribed with the positive function of giving meaning to the 
signified. Ascribing a positive function to the gaze reduces the subject to a realization 
of that gaze and attributes the power to bring the subject into being to the big Other. 
Copjec refers to this phenomena as locating the ‘gaze in front’ of the image, a process 
that associates the emergence of the subject with its signification. This traps the 
subject in representation by positing a semblance between the subject and its signifier 
that denies the subject the possibility of imagining a position outside the gaze. Hebdige 
feels condemned because, by conceptualizing the gaze as fulfilling a positive function, 
he and the subjects represented in his text are trapped in their own image as it is 
presented to them by the gaze. Literally, as Hebdige conceptualizes the relationship 
between the gaze and the subject, the language in which he must represent the subjects
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of subculture locks him in a position that denies access to the object of his desire. The 
problem does not lie in the inability of Hebdige to obtain the object of his desire, but in 
the assumption that there exists something beyond the signifier. That there is a real 
sociality out there to be obtained behind the signifier that is not theoretical. The failure 
Hebdige associates with his text has nothing to do with semiotics and all to do with his 
conception of the gaze. For if the gaze did not serve the positive function of 
recognition then the subject could be articulated as a phenomena of language and 
Hebdige’s text would be a success.
Lacan offers an alternative explanation to this perceived failure, providing an 
alternative conception of the relationship between the subject and the gaze. By 
explaining the Lacanian conception of the gaze and its relationship to the subject, not 
only can the crisis of representation referred to above to be addressed but the question 
of the commodity form and its potential to act as a signifier of identity can be returned 
to as well. Once the gaze is repositioned in relation to the subject and its signifier we 
will see that the crisis of representation has less to do with the capacity to represent 
social reality and more to do with the willingness of anthropologists (and other social 
scientists) to sacrifice his or her position in the text - a position aligned with the gaze of 
the big Other. Once the position of the anthropologist is removed from the originaiy 
point of the gaze the radical potential of a Lacanian anthropology can be realized with 
the textual quality of existence being brought to the forefront in ethnography. Placing 
the textual quality of being at the center of ethnographic accounts enables the
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development of a truly post-structuralist ethnography in which culture is recognized as 
an effect of signification with difference amounting to a matter of style.
In Lacan’s understanding, the gaze cannot be turned to for affirmation of any sort 
because it does not see you. As is apparent from Lacan’s diagram of the two 
interpenetrating triangles, the Lacanian gaze is located “behind the 
image”(Copjecl994) What this means is that the “I” of the gaze with which Hebdige 
and Bolin would like to identify is always cut off from the subject. It is an 
unoccupiable point that cannot be signified. Copjec makes this clear when she states:
In Lacan, the gaze is located ‘behind’ the image, as that which fails to appear in it and thus 
as that which makes all its meanings suspect.. .Lacan does not ask you to think of the gaze 
as belonging to an Other who cares about what or where you are, who pries, keeps tabs 
on your whereabouts, and takes note o f all your steps and missteps. When you encounter 
the gaze of the Other, you meet not a seeing eye but a blind one. The gaze is not clear or 
penetrating, not filled with knowledge or recognition; it is clouded over and turned back 
on itself, absorbed in its own enjoyment. The horrible truth is that the gaze does not see 
you.(Copjecl994:36)
By locating the gaze behind the image Lacan sets up the visual field as always 
expressing a lack. This lack is endemic to all signifying networks that represent reality. 
The gaze is understood as always falling short of its promise for the clear and complete 
illumination of an object. Incorporating lack into our understanding of the graphic 
space of the gaze allows the subject to glean the possibility of a different perspective 
from which the same space might be viewed. An awareness of this lack on the part of 
the subject prevents the subject from ever being trapped by the gaze. It allows the 
subject to ask: “What is being concealed from me? What in this graphic space does not 
show, does not stop writing itself?”(Copjecl994:34) It is at this point in which 
something appears to be missing from representation that Lacan locates the point of the
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gaze. In the gaze described by Lacan, not only is the origin of the gaze recognized as 
an unoccupiable point since it is marked by an absence, but the impossibility of the 
gaze to illuminate the “Real” is also acknowledged. The “Real” of the gaze is shown to 
be an illusory construct of the gaze itself, something to which access is denied to the 
subject.
The importance of the question: What is being concealed from me?, and the 
articulation of the gaze as originating in absence, can be understood by returning to 
Hebdige. In Hebdige’s case recognizing the gaze as an unoccupiable point marked by 
absence allows the perceived failure of semiotics to prey open the seam between 
language and reality to be overcome. Rather than perceiving the seam to be invisible - 
the position demanded by a conception of the gaze as fulfilling a positive function - the 
very invisibility of the seam can be understood as marking the originaiy point of the 
gaze. Such a recognition illustrates the impossibility of occupying the point of the gaze 
since there is no point to be occupied. The invisibility of the seam marks the absence 
of a signified, as Copjec describes it, and hence the impossible real promised by the 
signifier. In other words the real world of “the people” to which Hebdige desires entry 
is an illusory construct of the signifier. The gulf Hebdige perceives as separating the 
intellectual from that the “Real” world is nothing more than Hebdige, as a subject, 
asking: “What is being concealed from me” in this graphic space? By recognizing this 
gulf as an absence, as a lack in the visual field of the gaze, the hysterical desire to peer 
beneath the veneer of signification, a capacity promised by the “F’ of the gaze, is 
resolved with the truth of cultural forms being shown to reside in its surface topology.
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Concentrating on the surface topological features of such cultural forms as gender 
and subculture allows these forms to be seen as “traps for the gaze”(Copjec). It is 
important to recognize the double meaning associated with this phrase. We can say 
that subculture and gender “trap the gaze”, meaning they attract the gaze by seeming to 
provide an instance in which representation seems to ‘generate its own 
beyond’.(Copjec) This usage posits the signifiers representing gender and subculture as 
providing access to an impossible world in which the gulf separating the signifier from 
the real is dissolved, allowing a glimpse beneath the signifier at the signified. This can 
be referred to as a trap because the collection of signifiers representing gender or 
subculture transfix the gaze, holding it in the joy of interpretation. The gaze is 
prevented from moving on, or recognizing what it is looking at as being nothing but a 
topological feature of the signification system. The second meaning associated with 
the word “traps” describes gender and subculture as providing a moment in which the 
gaze is caught off guard, as it were, and revealed as an absence. The graphic 
representation of gender and subculture as it is painted by the gaze, provides an 
instance in which one is induced to imagine “a gaze outside the field of 
representation.’’(Copjec) This is a trap since the gaze is caught in its own action, 
revealing that gender and subculture are effect as opposed to features of subjectivity. 
Recognizing gender and subculture as traps allows us to move beyond an understanding 
of their representation as being indicative either of a real set of social relations or of an 
essential quality that orders subjectivity underlying the surface signifiers and towards a
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description that embraces the radical implications of viewing social constructs as the 
representation of a lack in the symbolic network.
Viewing gender and subculture as the expression of a lack necessitates that the 
“F  of the gaze be envisioned as expressing a lack as well. Just as gender and 
subculture are radically visual domains where knowledge of the subject cannot be 
found, the “F  that views subculture must also be recognized as a place in the graphic 
space that covers over a lack. The “F  cannot be viewed as a place to locate an 
unencumbered view of the world. The “I” should be recognized as a signifier standing 
in relation to other signifiers in the graphic space of the gaze. This allows knowledge 
of the subject whose expressions formulate gender and subculture, and the “I” that 
views these formations, to be approached on their own terms and not those of the Big 
Other in whose visual space they appear. Failing to recognize the “F  as the expression 
of a lack produces a visual field in which the gaze functions positively and a positively 
functioning gaze has a determining effect on the subject it illuminates.(Copjec), thereby 
introducing a political concern into the process of representation.
The Lacanian view locates the subject in the very lack covered over by its 
signifier, circumventing the need to develop a political discourse surrounding the 
subject’s representation. The political concern shifts to the effect of symbolic networks 
in which subjects appear. This enables us to recognize that the subject will always 
appear distorted in its representation and it is the job of the researcher to describe how 
the experience of the subject becomes distorted, but not the subject. Our descriptions 
cannot concentrate on the subject because the subject cannot be described.
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Ethnology’s task is to describe the signifying system that covers over the subject and 
makes subjectivity visible and not the appearance of the subject as it is distorted and 
condensed by systems of signification. In this way the subject will always appear as a 
lack and not as the result of a gaze. The reason the subject is to be found in this lack is 
because this lack in the visual field, in the symbolic network itself, founds the subject. 
The subject is established as a being of desire by this lack, by the inability of the 
symbolic network to signify reality. Copjec clarifies this when she states:
Lacan locates the cause of being in the informe: the unformed (that which has no signified, 
no significant shape in the visual field) and the inquiry (the question posed to 
representations presumed reticence). The subject is the effect of the impossibility of 
seeing what is lacking in the representation, what the subject, therefore wants to 
see.(Copjecl994:35)
Literally, the subject as a being of desire is founded on a lack in the signifying network 
and not as the realization of a gaze. The subject can never be located in its 
representation. The critical reader will quickly realize the suspect implications of 
Lacan’s understanding of representation. After all if the subject is not to be found in its 
representation than what is to stop us from producing misanthropic ethnography? It 
seems that Lacan relativizes the visual field to the point where any representation, no 
matter how vulgar, is valid since the subject doesn’t reside in its representation anyway. 
The Lacanian response might be to say that a racist or misogynist ethnography is just as 
valid as an ethnography that attempts to be non-racist, they are both equally mis-guided 
by the desire to capture the subject in the gaze of the Big Other. The analysis of a 
racist ethnography would reveal this desire and the affect of representation which is the 
goal in the first place.
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This calls into question who benefits from a politics centering on representation. 
In Lacanian terms the subject is understood as that which is always being written out of 
the visual field of the signifier, as that which is absent in its representation. A politics 
centered on the moral and philosophical implications of representing the subject in a 
certain light demands the luxury of a transcendent “I” occupying the visual field not 
afforded to the anthropologist. Anthropology than, should be recognized as a radically 
descriptive field with the objective to describe the visual space in which the subject 
experiences itself. Recognizing ethnography as a graphic art in which the visual space 
of different subjectivities are described repositions the representations created by the 
ethnographer, moving them from fictitious accounts that bring the subject into being, to 
depictions of alternative graphic spaces in which subjectivity expresses itself. This 
brings attention to the fact that the ‘ethnos’ of ethnography is nothing more than a 
surface phenomena of the signifier. The study of culture then is the study of style, with 
semiotics providing the interpretive strategy that leads to knowledge of the effect of a 
signifying system on subjectivity. And since as Copjec states, signifiers are material, 
‘opaque’ as opposed to translucent, and refer only to other signifiers rather than directly 
to a signified(Copjecl994:34), anthropology must take to heart the Lacanian phrase 
stating, “Style is the man himself’.
Positioning anthropology as a study in style, or the study of the formal properties 
of signifiers as they are arranged by subjects, produces a truly post-structuralist 
anthropology in which the authority of the author as the purveyor of meaning is 
removed. The anthropologist is taken out of the position of authority because to write
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ethnography is to celebrate the multiple viewpoints from which all graphic spaces can 
be seen. This automatically removes the authority of the gaze associated with the 
viewpoint of the author. The £T ’ of the author’s gaze is defined by its relationship to 
other signifiers and not as an authority on the contents of a graphic space. Recognizing 
that there is no authority whose reading of a graphic space can define the meaning of its 
content shows how Hebdige started us down the road towards a Lacanian anthropology 
but foundered on the shores of an impossible real promised by the signifier. Hebdige 
fell into a trap placed by the gaze that promised knowledge of the world beyond the 
signifier, a world in which he could identify with the £T ’ of the gaze and have the gulf 
separating reality from experience disappear. Hebdige fell for this trap due to his 
desire to become a unified subject by occupying the point of the gaze. In Hebdige’s 
case the trap laid by the gaze was the commodity form, a signifier that when viewed as 
a fetish promises entry into the impossible world of the “Real”, but when viewed as an 
opaque signifier that gains meaning in relation to other signifiers and the desire of a 
subject promises nothing more than knowledge of its surface and of the gaze that 
inscribes it with something more.
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